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Tiivistelmä 
Pörssinoteerattujen rahastojen eli ETF:ien äkillisen kasvun vuoksi akateemikot ja lainsäätäjät ovat 
yhä enemmän kiinnostuneet ETF:ien mahdollisista vaikutuksista osakemarkkinoihin. Useat 
tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet, että ETF-rahastoilla saattaa olla epävakauttava vaikutus osakkeisiin, 
joita rahastot omistavat. Muun muassa Ben-David ym. (2018) esittivät, että ETF:t luovat uuden 
kaupankäyntitason niiden omistamiin osakkeisiin, mikä johtaa volatiliteetin kasvuun kyseisissä 
osakkeissa. Lähes kaikki aiheesta tehdyt tutkimukset, on toteutettu käyttäen dataa Yhdysvaltojen 
markkinoilta, jotka ovat erittäin helposti saavutettavat ja likvidit markkinat. Myös pohjoismainen 
markkina on kokenut samankaltaista kehitystä ETF:ien saralla viime vuosien aikana, ja tästä johtuen 
laajennan Ben-David ym. (2018) tekemää tutkimusta käsittämään myös ETF:ien vaikutusta 
pohjoismaisiin osakkeisiin. 
Tutkimukseni tulokset ovat lähes päinvastaiset Ben-David ym. (2018) saamiin tutkimustuloksiin 
nähden. Tulokset osoittavat, että ETF:t ovat vähentäneet volatiliteettia omistamissaan osakkeissa 
vuosien 2009-2018 aikana. Lisäksi tutkielma osoittaa, että ETF:t lisäävät kaupankäyntiä osakkeilla 
sekä parantavat likviditeettiä omistamissaan osakkeissa, ja ovat vähentäneet osakkeiden tuottojen 
korrelaatiota ja ylituottoa. Yleisesti ottaen pohjoismaiset markkinat näyttävät hyötyvän 
lisääntyneestä tehokkuudesta, jota ETF:t tarjoavat. Toisaalta, tutkimukseni osoittaa myös, ettei 
ETF:ien ja volatiliteein välinen korrelaatio ole lineaarinen. Tämä tarkoittaa, että niin kauan kun 
ETF:ien omistus osakkeissa pysyy kohtuullisena, niiden vaikutus osakkeisiin on positiivinen. Mikäli 
ETF:ien suosio kuitenkin vielä kasvaa vaikutus saattaa kääntyä päinvastaiseksi. Ben-David ym. 
(2018) antavat ymmärtää, että Yhdysvaltojen markkinat ovat jo ohittaneet tämän kynnysarvon, jossa 
epäfundamentaaliset likviditeettisokit ovat riittävän tiheitä, että sokit aiheuttavat volatiliteetin kasvua 
osakkeissa. Vaikka pohjoismaalainen markkina on tähän mennessä hyötynyt lisääntyneestä 
kilpailusta, lainsäätäjien tulisi olla tietoisia, että vaikutus joka ETF:llä on osakemarkkinoihin nykyisin 
ei välttämättä ole pysyvää, mikäli sama vaikutus kuin ETF:llä on Yhdysvalloissa saapuisi myös 
Suomeen.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The popularity of passive investing has risen from the growing recognition of its cost-
efficiency and diversification benefits compared to active forms of investing. (Madhavan, 
2016, 3-4.) Passive investing aims to track a specific market-weighted index or portfolio 
and the most common way to do this is by buying an index fund as the goal is to maximize 
profits by minimizing trading. Passive investing is growing at a rapid rate accounting for 
one third of all assets managed in the US. (Sullivan & Xiong, 2012.) 
The innovation of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) has played a considerable role in 
driving the growth of passive investing in the past decade since most ETFs are passive 
index tracking funds. (Malamud, 2015.) An ETF is a marketable security that aims to 
replicate a chosen stock index, commodity, basket of assets or bonds rather than outper-
form it. Since ETFs are traded like stocks on an exchange, the price will change through-
out the day. (Madhavan, 2016, 3-4.)  
Exchange-traded funds were first introduced in the 1980s and have grown substantially 
in the recent decade in terms of size, diversity and market significance. (Madhavan, 2016, 
3-4) In 2015, for the first time ever, assets under management of ETFs passed the amount 
of assets of hedge funds. In September 2018, the assets of exchange-traded products 
(ETPs) reached 5.2 trillion US dollars, a notable growth from 79 billion in year 2000, 
which implies a 26% compounded annual growth rate (BlackRock, Inc., 2018), double 
the growth rate that of actively managed assets (Sullivan & Xiong, 2012). The growth of 
global ETP assets from 2000 to September 2018 is presented in Figure 1. Equity based 
exchange-traded products (ETP) account for 80% of all ETPs in September 2018. The 
US is overwhelmingly the largest market for ETPs with assets of 3,713 billion USD fol-
lowed by Europe with assets of 854 billion USD. (BlackRock, Inc., 2018.)  
What makes ETFs distinctive and popular is that they allow investors to access the 
market continuously similarly to stocks, with high liquidity and with a low trading cost. 
In addition, ETFs are created through a unique process called creation and redemption, 
which is exclusively managed by liquidity providers called authorized participants (APs). 
These so-called APs have a dual role as they act as liquidity providers for the ETF market 
and as arbitrageurs between the securities and ETF market. In exchange for providing 
liquidity for the fund, APs have the right to perform arbitrage with ETFs and the under-
lying securities. However, the same reasons that make ETFs so distinctive may also at-
tract more high-frequency demand than e.g. traditional index funds and may therefore 
have the capability to destabilize the market. (Ben-David et al., 2018.) 
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Figure 1  Global ETP assets (Adapted from BlackRock, Inc., 2018) 
For example, active investing is a form of investing that aims to outperform the market, 
and therefore active investors have some discretion and control in which extent they trade 
and impact the price of the underlying security since they have the opportunity to choose 
in which asset, they want to invest in. (Da and Shive, 2015.) Trading with  underlying 
securities of ETFs, on the other hand, is very mechanical and may therefore have a larger 
impact on the price of the underlying security. Since ETFs aim to replicate specific indi-
ces, there seem to be no discretion in the size, timing or composition of the trades of ETF 
arbitragers. As a result, ETFs may cause larger non-fundamental price shocks to the un-
derlying assets than other funds. (Da and Shive, 2015.) 
Researchers have discovered that US stocks have become more vulnerable in recent 
years to unanticipated events. Among other risk factors, systematic risk has risen over the 
last decades among large companies. Systematic risk was calculated as the cross-sectional 
average beta for every year in the sample period (1963-2008). (Kamara et al., 2010.) One 
possible reason for this trend is believed to come from the rise of passive asset manage-
ment. Further, the growth of passively managed equity indices has been predicted to cor-
respond to the rise in systematic market risk. (Sullivan & Xiong, 2012.) 
ETFs play a key role in the passive investment trend and have the power to become a 
disruptive innovation for the current asset management industry. Several earlier studies 
(see, e.g. Anton & Polk, 2014; Leippold et al., 2016; Agarwal et al., 2018) have found 
that ETF ownership in shares may cause excess comovement in returns and commonality 
in liquidity in the underlying shares. Return comovement refers to positive correlation in 
stock returns among different securities (Barberis et al., 2002) and commonality in liquid-
ity refers to an impact of a common or market wide liquidity factor on an individual share 
(Brockman et al., 2009). Therefore, ETFs may have the capability to destabilize the se-
curities market and create a new risk structure. However, the existing literature focuses 
nearly only in the US market which is a highly accessible market and therefore the impact 
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of the rise of exchange-traded funds have in other markets is still widely unclear and 
complicated.  
1.2 Objective of the study 
Since the quantity, popularity and significance of ETFs has increased significantly over 
the past decade in the financial markets, it is important to understand the effects that ETFs 
may have on the share volatility and further on market risk. The goal of this study is to 
find if ETF ownership does increase daily volatility in the shares that the ETFs own (un-
derlying stock) in the Nordics.  The study is widely influenced by the study made by Ben-
David et al. (2018) and this study is going to contribute to it by examining if the same 
results can be found in other markets than in the US. The theoretical framework is largely 
based on Greenwood’s (2005) theory on the dynamics of arbitrage. 
The main research question is: 
➢ How does ETF ownership affect the volatility of the underlying stock in the Nordic 
market? 
Based on previous studies made on the US market, the null hypothesis is that ETF 
ownership increases volatility in the underlying shares due to the unique arbitrage process 
between the ETFs and the underlying securities. The arbitrage process may cause non-
fundamental liquidity shocks in the shares through non-fundamental liquidity shocks in 
the ETF. When these liquidity shocks are frequent enough, they may cause excess vola-
tility in the shares. In sum, shares with higher ETF ownership should experience higher 
volatility. 
However, the Nordic market is very different from the US market in terms of owner-
ship structure, liquidity and size. Therefore, in order to further understand the overall 
implications that ETF have on market risk in the Nordic market, I will examine the rela-
tion between ETF ownership and other forms of equity market efficiencies and risk fac-
tors. The supporting research questions that I am going to address are: 
➢ How does ETF ownership affect  
o liquidity of the underlying stock? 
o return comovement of the underlying stock? 
o excess return of the underlying stock? 
The study concentrates on the Nordic markets using as data the stocks included in 
Nasdaq OMX Nordic 120 index from January 2009 to December 2018. Majority of the 
data is retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon database. The empirical study for the main 
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research question is going to conducted using regression analysis on ETF ownership and 
volatility while controlling for other factors, such as other forms of ownership, size and 
liquidity.  
The discussion in the literary review is restricted to “ordinary” ETFs that only aim to 
replicate the benchmark index, and therefore excludes leveraged ETFs that use deriva-
tives to track the performance of the benchmark. 
1.3 Structure of the study 
This study is based on a comprehensive literature review on the topic as well as an em-
pirical study attempting introduce new knowledge to the academic community. The study 
proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework on liquidity shock gen-
eration caused by arbitrage and is followed by earlier empirical studies made on the sub-
ject. Section 3 introduces the data collection, sample characteristics, and methodology. 
Section 4 provides the main findings of the empirical study, and finally, Section 5 con-
cludes and summarizes, and gives suggestions for further research. 
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2 INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS AND THEORETICAL FRAME-
WORK 
The theoretical framework of this study is largely based on Greenwood’s (2005) frame-
work on the dynamics of asset prices in an unexpected event in which several assets sim-
ultaneously experience a non-fundamental liquidity shock. Ben-David et al. (2018) has 
contributed to the study by Greenwood (2005) by extending the framework to include 
ETFs and by providing two alternative hypotheses on why ETFs increase the volatility of 
the underlying stock. These hypotheses are liquidity trading hypothesis and price discov-
ery hypothesis. 
 Liquidity trading hypothesis suggests that the volatility in the underlying shares is 
caused by noise traders that cause demand shocks in the secondary market that are prop-
agated to the securities market through the arbitrage activity of authorized participants. 
Price discovery hypothesis on the other hand suggests that new information is first dis-
covered in the ETF and the information will enter the prices of the underlying securities 
in a delay. ETFs therefore would improve price discovery. The shock is propagated 
through the same channel as in the liquidity trading hypothesis but instead of noise trad-
ers, shocks are caused by information traders. In these both cases volatility will spike 
because of ETFs but for different reasons.  
2.1 Institutional details 
2.1.1 Structure of ETFs 
ETFs are investment funds that usually focus on holding securities of a particular asset 
class, industry, or geographical area. They resemble passive index funds but are listed on 
exchanges and are traded intraday by retail and institutional investors. ETFs were first 
introduced in the 1980s but started to gain more popularity in the 1990s. Since the turn of 
the century the number of ETFs has grown explosively and at one point in 2012, ex-
change-traded products accounted for 40% of all trading volume in the US securities mar-
kets. (Ben-David et al., 2018.) The structure of an exchange-traded fund is presented in 
Figure 2. 
The structure of exchange-traded funds has qualities from both open-ended and closed-
end funds. However, unlike in mutual funds, interaction between the fund and the investor 
does not automatically lead to creation or redemption of ETF shares. Investors trade di-
rectly with each other or alternatively with authorized participants (APs). If there is a net 
demand for ETFs, the AP will deliver a basket of securities to the ETF asset manager in 
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exchange for ETF creation units. Therefore, the flows of the fund and demand for ETF 
shares exerts pressure on the price of the underlying security. (Madhavan, 2016, 21.) 
 
Figure 2 Structure of an exchange-traded fund (Adapted from Madhavan, 2016, 
21) 
APs are liquidity providers who can interact directly with the fund. APs are usually 
large financial institutions or specialized market makers. The asset managers of ETFs 
choose the APs in advance before creating a fund giving them exclusive rights to alter the 
number of ETFs outstanding through creation and redemption process. APs have a critical 
role in providing liquidity to the fund and linking the primary market of the underlying 
securities with the secondary market of ETF shares. Large exchange-traded funds have 
several APs whereas smaller niche funds may have only a few specialized authorized 
participants. APs do not receive compensation from the ETF asset manager nor is it le-
gally required to create or redeem ETF shares. Usually, the compensation to the APs come 
from the market-making activities in the secondary markets through arbitrage. 
As presented in Figure 2, ETF shares are created in a process called creation and re-
demption mechanism. The transaction allows for APs to exchange basket of securities or 
cash for ETF shares and vice versa with the ETF asset manager (see Figure 2, transaction 
between AP and ETF asset manager). Like regular investors APs can purchase and sell 
shares of ETFs in the secondary market (see Figure 2, transaction between AP and inves-
tor) but in addition, they can purchase and redeem shares directly from the ETF if there 
is a profit opportunity by purchasing ETFs from the investors and exchanging the ETF 
units with the asset manager to a basket of securities. This could be the case if the ETF 
was priced below net asset value. 
Even though shares are redeemed and created at the end of the day, APs will lock in 
their profits intraday by selling the higher priced asset and buying the lower priced asset. 
The creation and redemption mechanism is based on arbitrage to keep the price of the 
ETF share as close as possible to the intrinsic value of the underlying securities. The 
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arbitrage mechanism also encourages the APs to provide liquidity when there is a demand 
for purchasing or selling ETF shares. The creation and redemptions mechanism serve two 
critical purposes. First, the creation and redemption mechanism offer an additional pri-
mary market to the AP and through that improves liquidity in the secondary market. Sec-
ond, the mechanism ensures that the ETFs are traded at a price in line with the underlying 
net asset value (NAV). The AP can then exploit any deviations of the ETF price from 
NAV by taking opposite positions. (Malamud, 2015.) The mechanism of arbitrage will 
be explained more closely in the next section. 
2.1.2 ETFs and the mechanism of arbitrage 
ETFs have features from both closed- and open-ended funds yet still have some distinc-
tive qualities.  Like open-ended funds, ETFs can be created and redeemed at the end of 
the trading day at NAV. However, unlike open-ended funds, ETFs can be created and 
redeemed only by APs that have a legal contract and exclusivity to alter the number of 
ETFs outstanding. Like closed-end funds, ETFs are traded intraday on an exchange in the 
secondary market at a price that can diverge from NAV since the price of ETFs are de-
termined by the demand and supply in the secondary market. Unlike closed-end funds, 
ETFs have the ability to force the price closer to NAV through the arbitrage mechanism. 
(Ben-David et al., 2018.) 
ETF market can be divided into primary and secondary markets. Primary market is 
where the underlying shares are traded, and the secondary market is where ETFs are 
traded. Authorized Participants are liquidity providers who have a critical role in connect-
ing the primary and secondary markets. APs have an exclusive capability to alter the 
number of ETFs outstanding through the creation and redemption process. Creation/re-
demption process is key to the price and tax efficiency. (Madhavan, 2016, 31-32.)  
 
Figure 3  Creation of ETF shares (Adapted from Investment Company Institution, 
2018) 
16 
Creation of ETFs are done by transferring the underlying securities of the ETF to the 
ETF asset manager. In exchange, the asset manager provides the AP with ETF creation 
units. (Ben-David et al., 2018.) The ETF creation process is presented in Figure 3. Crea-
tion unit consists of a number of ETF shares, usually between 25,000 to 250,000 shares. 
The value of a creation unit is based on the ETF’s NAV at the end of the day that the 
creation was initiated. (Investment Company Institute, 2018.) Similarly, redemption is 
executed by AP receiving underlying securities in exchange for ETF units. These trans-
actions made by APs constitute the primary markets for ETFs. (Ben-David et al., 2018.) 
In order to demonstrate the process of arbitrage in the creation and redemption of 
ETFs, we provide two cases: ETF premium and ETF discount. When an ETF is prices 
above NAV, it is called premium, and if an ETF is priced below NAV, it is called dis-
count. In the case of ETF premium, the APs will purchase the underlying shares, exchange 
them for ETF units and sell the ETFs on the secondary market. By increasing the number 
of ETFs in the secondary market and reducing the number of shares in the stock market, 
the AP will put downward pressure on the price of the ETF and upward price pressure on 
the NAV, reducing the premium. On the other hand, in the case of ETF discount, the APs 
will purchase ETF units on the secondary market, exchange them for securities and sell 
the securities in the primary market. This will put positive price pressure on the ETF and 
negative price pressure on the NAV, decreasing the discount. In rare cases, creation and 
redemption is done in cash. This happens generally when the underlying securities are 
illiquid or foreign. (Ben-David et al., 2018.) 
Due to the unique arbitrage process of ETFs, premia and discounts between the ETF 
and NAV can be arbitraged away. Since this is not possible in closed-end funds, the mag-
nitude of the divergence between fund price and NAV is smaller in ETFs. The arbitrage 
process also encourages APs to provide liquidity when ETFs are experiencing excess 
buying or selling demand. (Ben-David et al., 2018.) 
Arbitrage can also be exploited by parties that are not Authorized Participants nor can 
undertake the creation and redemption process. Any investor can exploit the divergence 
between the price of the ETF and the underlying securities by purchasing the cheaper one 
and selling short the more expensive one. The investor then holds the position until the 
prices converge and then realize the profits from arbitrage. (Ben-David et al., 2018.) 
ETF sponsors provide NAV values every 15 seconds in order to facilitate arbitrage 
since arbitrage is what keeps the tracking error of the fund low. Because of the low trading 
cost and the availability of continuous information, arbitrage between the ETF and the 
underlying securities has become increasingly popular among hedge funds and high-fre-
quency traders. (Marshall et al., 2010.)  
The secondary market liquidity is also a distinctive feature compared to mutual funds 
that provide liquidity only at the end of the trading day. ETFs are traded intraday on an 
exchange creating an addition layer of liquidity to the market. However, trading activity 
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in the secondary market does not imply creation and redemption activity since investors 
can trade with each other or APs. (Madhavan, 2016, 31-32.) The trading activity in the 
secondary market is, according to Investment Company Institute statistics (2018), four 
times the creation/redemption activity. 
2.1.3 ETFs in the Nordics 
Even though nearly all studies made on ETFs concentrate on the US market, the same 
structure and features found in the ETFs holding US companies can be found in the ones 
holding shares of Nordic companies. This is mainly since ETFs with large ownerships in 
Nordic companies are held by large international investment management companies 
such as BlackRock and S&P. Based on the data retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon 
database, there are nine ETFs in total based in the Nordics. The Nordic ETFs are presented 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
ETFs based in the Nordics (20.9.2019) 
Name Domicile 
Market cap 
EURm 
Management 
fee 
iNAV 
update 
XACT OMXS30 ETF Finland, Norway, Sweden 702 0.10% 3 min 
DNB OBX ETF Norway, Sweden 104 0.30% NA 
XACT Sverige (UCITS ETF) Finland, Norway, Sweden 270 0.15% 3 min 
Seligson & Co OMX Helsinki 25 ETF Finland 264 0.16% "Frequently" 
XACT OBX (UCITS ETF) Norway 71 0.30% 3 min 
XACT Norden (ETF) Finland, Norway, Sweden 1 191 0.15% 3 min 
XACT Svenska Smabolag (ETF) Sweden 160 0.30% 3 min 
XACT OMXC25 (UCITS ETF) Denmark 16 0.20% 3 min 
XACT Nordic High Dividend Low Vola-
tility ETF 
Sweden 199 0.30% 3 min 
 
In total, there are three companies providing ETFs in the Nordics: Xact, DNB and 
Seligson & Co. Xact is a leading Nordic ETF provider, DNB is one of Norway’s largest 
financial services groups and Seligson & Co is a Finnish investment company. Of the 
nine ETFs, seven are provided by Xact. The scarcity of Nordic ETFs supports the notion 
that ETFs owning Nordic companies are in most cases not from the Nordics, but from 
large international financial institutions. However, there seem to be no significant differ-
ences between ETFs outside of the Nordics investing in Nordic companies and Nordic 
ETFs.  
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All of the ETFs presented in Table 1, follow a certain equity index or group of shares, 
are traded intraday and have large financial institutions as APs. For instance, ETFs Selig-
son & Co OMX Helsinki 25 ETF is a fund investing in shares listed in the Helsinki stock 
market and aims to follow the benchmark index with as low expenses as possible. The 
shares of the ETFs are traded similarly to regular shares during the opening times of the 
stock market. 
The average expense ratio of the Nordic ETFs is 0.22% in 2018 whereas Morningstar’s 
study on U.S. funds reported the average asset-weighted expense ratio to be 0.44% in 
2018 among ETFs. (Monrningstar, 2019.) The expense ration in the Nordics seems to be 
lower than in the US but no meaningful generalizations can be made from a such small 
sample. The low expense ratio may compensate for lower liquidity or perhaps it is based 
on local competition. 
APs are often stated to be large financial institutions. Same can be said about APs of 
Nordic ETFs. For instance, the banks acting as APs for Seligson’s ETF include Handels-
banken, Danske Bank, Deutsche Bank, Evli, Nordea and Morgan Stanley, i.e. large finan-
cial institutions. 
Finally, commonly ETF sponsors provide the indicative net asset value (iNAV) every 
15 seconds in order to facilitate arbitrage. This is where the most significant differences 
seem to lie. ETFs presented in Table 1 reported varying iNAV updating frequencies. Xact 
reported that iNav for its ETFs are updated every 3 minutes, which is already infrequent 
compared to every 15 seconds. Seligson reported to update its iNAV “very frequently”, 
which is a fairly ambiguous statement. DNB stated that it updates its NAV five times a 
week, once a day but does not mention the indicative NAV. In conclusion, based on basic 
characteristics of ETFs, Nordic ETFs do not differ from other international ETFs signifi-
cantly, except for the frequency it facilitates its investors with indicative net asset values. 
The fact that ETF managers in the Nordics do not provide the iNAV as frequently that 
the theory would suggest, it might have an effect on the efficiency that the market price 
of the ETF is able to follow the net asset value of the fund. 
2.2 Dynamics of arbitrage 
2.2.1 Efficient market hypothesis and limited arbitrage 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been a central theory in finance for nearly 
fifty years. Fama (1970) defined the efficient market as one in which all prices always 
fully reflect all available information. In other words, no investor can continuously beat 
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the market on average and therefore everyone should only passively hold a market port-
folio.  
The theoretical foundations of EMH rely on three assumptions. First, investors are 
rational and therefore value securities rationally. Second, in case of irrational investors, 
their trading is assumed to be non-correlated and random and should therefore cancel 
each other out. Third, in case of correlated irrational trading, the price impact of irrational 
traders is eliminated by rational traders, i.e. arbitrageurs. 
The efficient market depends on the efficiency of arbitrageurs. Sharpe and Alexander 
(1990) define arbitrage as ‘the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially 
similar, security in two different markets at advantageously different prices.’ Therefore, 
arbitrage does not require capital and is risk free (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Suppose a 
security is over-priced relative to its fundamental value, e.g. its risk adjusted net present 
value of its cash flows, because of an irrational investor. An arbitrageur would in this case 
sell the over-priced security and purchase a similar security to hedge the risk of the posi-
tion. The arbitrageur would then earn a profit by selling and purchasing substitutes. The 
activity of arbitrageurs would then bring the price of the security to its fundamental value. 
(Shleifer, 2000, 3-4.) If arbitrage is effective, meaning that substitutes are available, and 
arbitrage is competitive, prices never diverge far from their fundamental value (Scholes, 
1972). 
However, in contrast to the EMH, arbitrage is risky and therefore limited. There might 
not be substitutes available and arbitrage comes with transaction cost, which both limit 
arbitrage. Even arbitrage between identical securities and with no transaction cost can be 
risky since mis-pricing might deepen in the short run due to investor sentiment. Shleifer 
(2000, 51-52, 87) proposes two conditions of how investor sentiment could affect asset 
prices. First, trading of individual investors is systematic and simultaneous. Second, ar-
bitrageurs have limitations that prevent them to exploit the mispricing of irrational inves-
tors.  
The first condition suggests that in order for irrational investors to have a significant 
impact on asset prices, should individual investors be systematically and simultaneously 
purchasing and selling the same securities, i.e. trading decisions should be correlated. 
The impact of an individual investor in asset prices should be close to non-existing. 
However, if trading behavior is very correlated and systematic, individual investors can 
impact the asset prices. This group of individual investors is called ‘noise traders’. (Bar-
ber et al., 2009.) Noise traders are investors that make trading decisions based on noise 
rather than information and interprets noise as fundamental information. According to 
traditional financial theories, identical securities should be priced alike due to arbitrage, 
but this is not always the case. The additional risk caused by noise traders have been 
found to be one reason why.  
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Shleifer (2000, 33-34) predicts that noise trader risk might be market wide rather than 
idiosyncratic. Therefore, noise trading may affect the market or a large group of securi-
ties. This would make noise trader risk systematic. The assumption that noise trader risk 
is systematic requires that securities affected by noise traders should have positive return 
correlation, even though the fundamentals would not be.  
When researching ETFs, Ben-David et al. (2018) found the arbitrage activity of APs 
to be limited and therefore when the non-fundamental trading in the ETF is systematic 
enough, the price of the ETF will be affected for a protracted period. In addition, because 
of the arbitrage activity not only will the ETF be affected by the non-fundamental demand 
but also the underlying shares. Greenwood (2005) extends the limited arbitrage theory by 
creating a model on the effects of multiple demand shock on asset returns in a setting with 
limited arbitrage. The model predicts that securities correlated with an asset facing a de-
mand shock should experience returns because of its hedging role in the arbitrageur’s 
portfolio. This theory will be further discussed in the next section. 
2.2.2 Shock propagation with limited arbitrage 
Greenwood (2005) developed a framework to examine the dynamics of asset prices in an 
unexpected event in which several assets simultaneously experience a non-fundamental 
liquidity shock through uninformed investor demand. Demand shocks often affect several 
securities at the same time, but in different proportions. Simultaneous demand shocks can  
occur through several different channels including portfolio restructuring, index arbi-
trage, swap sales or liquidating of a fund, since all cases involve simultaneous trading of 
multiple stocks.  
The limited arbitrage model developed by Greenwood (2005) describes the response 
of asset prices to an unexpected simultaneous change in investor demand in several secu-
rities. The limited arbitrage model is summarized as follows. The capital market consists 
of many risky assets with a limited supply. Simultaneously at time t, the securities face 
an unexpected demand shock changing the net supply of the assets. Arbitrageurs accom-
modate the demand shock but receive higher expected returns as a compensation for the 
increased risk. The event returns decline over time reversing the returns caused by the 
demand shock. 
The model proposes three different assumptions that are confirmed through an empir-
ical study. First, the model predicts an increase in asset prices following an increase in 
demand for the asset or asset group. Further, the security price changes in proportion to 
its contribution to the total risk of the diversified portfolio. In other words, the return is 
proportional to the covariance of fundamental risk of the asset. The higher the demand 
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shock is and the higher the covariance with other securities, the higher is the impact of 
the shock.  
The second assumption proposes that also other assets, that are not directly affected 
by the demand shock, experience event returns because they play a hedging role in the 
arbitrageur’s portfolio. Stocks whose fundamentals are positively correlated with stocks 
that experience a positive (negative) demand shock will experience a positive (negative) 
price impact, though no direct demand change has occurred.  
For example, let’s assume two assets, asset 1 and 2, that are positively correlated. Asset 
1 experiences a non-fundamental positive demand shock through an index trader. Asset 
2 will then experience positive event returns even though there is no change in demand. 
The positive event return in asset 2 arise from the fact that arbitrageurs must be compen-
sated for their short position in asset 1. Therefore, the risk of the short position in asset 1 
is hedged by a long position in asset 2 driving up the price of the second asset. In conclu-
sion, prices of securities that are not directly affected by the demand shock are affected 
by it as arbitrageurs use them for hedging. 
The third assumption proposes a negative linear relationship between the initial return 
associated with the change in demand and the post-event returns. The initial return is the 
change in price that the arbitrageurs require that they can have positive expected returns 
following the event. However, this price change is expected to revert linearly over time.  
Greenwood (2005) assumes that two types of agents operate in the market: index trad-
ers that on a fixed quantity of securities, denoted by N × 1 vector u, and arbitrageurs. The 
first proposition suggests that a demand shock u followed by the vector of price changes 
is given by 
 
𝑃𝑡∗ − 𝑃𝑡∗−1 = 𝜀𝑡∗ + 𝛾 ∑((𝑇 − 𝑡
∗)𝑢 + 𝑄), (1) 
where P is the price of the security, 𝜀𝑡∗ is the information shock announced at time t*,  
∑  is the covariance matrix of fundamentals, u is the vector of demand shocks and Q is 
the vector of fixed supply. The proposition states that the vector of price change is pro-
portional to the covariance matrix of fundamentals and the vector of demand shocks. The 
term 𝜀𝑡∗ can be interpreted as new fundamental information received to the market and 
∑ 𝑄 the average required return of the market portfolio. There are two reason why 
changes in supply affect prices: risk aversion of arbitrageurs and uncertainty of future 
fundamentals. If arbitrageurs would be risk neutral or future fundamentals were not un-
certain, arbitrageurs would take infinitely large positions against mis-pricing but this is 
usually not the case. In the first equation, the constant term (T −  t*) can be interpreted 
as the “horizon-related multiplier”.  The terminal date represents the resolution of uncer-
tainty or end of return reversal. In the case that T would be large relative to t*, noise would 
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become an additional source of risk as returns reversed between any two periods would 
diminish. 
The second assumption proposes that also securities that are not directly affected by 
the demand shock but are correlated with the affected securities are also affected by the 
shock. The expected event returns for securities affected by the demand shock are given 
in Equation 1 and returns of securities not directly affected by the shock is given by 
 
𝑃𝑡∗ − 𝑃𝑡∗−1 = 𝜀𝑡∗ + 𝛾∅′((𝑇 − 𝑡
∗)𝑢1 + 𝑄), (2) 
where the (M × N) covariance matrix between the fundamentals of the M affected secu-
rities and the N unaffected securities is denoted by ∅ and u1 is the M × 1 vector of demand 
shocks for the M affected securities. 
The third assumption proposes that the initial return associated with the demand shock 
will revert over time. The expected price reversion, for the affected securities, between 
the event period t* and k periods after the event is given by 
 
𝐸𝑡∗(𝑃𝑡∗+𝑘 − 𝑃𝑡∗) = 𝑘𝛾 ∑(𝑄 − 𝑢), (3) 
where Q is the vector of fixed supply and u is the vector of index traders’ demand change. 
The post-event returns are negatively proportional to event returns, and reversal occurs 
when t approaches T. 
The expected post-event returns, for securities not affected by the demand shock, be-
tween period t* and k periods after the event is given by   
 
𝐸𝑡∗(𝑃𝑡∗+𝑘 − 𝑃𝑡∗) = 𝑘𝛾∅′(𝑄 − 𝑢1), (4) 
where the covariance matrix of fundamentals ∑   is substituted with the covariance matric 
of fundamentals between M and N. 
In the next section, we are going to discuss how liquidity shocks in ETFs are transmit-
ted to the underlying securities. The section proposes two alternative theories on the rea-
sons behind the shock propagation, the first one being in line with the limits-to-arbitrage 
model provided by Greenwood (2005).  
2.2.3 ETFs and liquidity shocks 
Ben-David et al. (2012) studied if arbitrage between an ETF and the underlying securities 
could create a new channel of shock transmission, in other words, if the presence of ETFs 
could cause contagion in the financial markets. The results showed that ETFs can propa-
gate non-fundamental liquidity shocks across asset classes that are tied to the ETF through 
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arbitrage channels. In addition, the study found supporting evidence for theories related 
to limits of arbitrage. Arbitrage does not only move prices for shares that are inefficiently 
priced but also for correctly priced shares if limits of arbitrage is present. When traders 
are affected by limits of arbitrage, liquidity shocks can be transmitted to another asset. 
Ben-David et al. (2012) propose two theories on why ETFs cause shock propagation 
in the underlying securities; a liquidity trading hypothesis and a price discovery hypoth-
esis. ETFs and the underlying securities are two assets with identical fundamentals and 
therefore should be priced alike. However, due to the structure of ETFs, they can be traded 
at prices that diverge from NAV.  
The theories propose two reasons for the shock propagation: liquidity (liquidity trading 
hypothesis) and information (price discovery hypothesis). Information traders trade on 
the basis of information that is not known for everyone. Liquidity traders, on the other 
hand, trade for reasons that are not related to information or financial markets but rather 
for reasons that reflect the trader’s personal liquidity needs, e.g. portfolio rebalancing. 
(Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988.) 
 
Figure 4  Non-fundamental shocks propagated through arbitrage (Adapted from 
Ben-David et al., 2012) 
The first theory presented in Figure 4 suggests that ETFs are faced with a non-funda-
mental liquidity shock, that could arise from e.g. liquidity trades. Situation (a) represent 
the initial equilibrium where the price of the ETF is equal to NAV and both are priced at 
fundamental value. In situation (b) a non-fundamental shock, such as a large purchase, 
hits the ETF, putting positive price pressure on it and the price of the ETF rises above the 
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fundamental value. Since the price of the ETF deviate from NAV, arbitrage will take 
place. The arbitrage mechanism explained earlier will initially put negative price pressure 
on the ETF and positive price pressure on the NAV, but in the long run both NAV and 
the ETF will settle to the fundamental value. In this case, the shocks propagated to the 
underlying stocks through arbitrage are non-fundamental. 
However, the first assumption on shock propagations is not alone sufficient enough 
since a similar effect could emerge from a fundamental shock. The second theory pre-
sented in Figure 5 proposes that the underlying security faces a new fundamental value 
as shown in situation (b). In the case that the ETF market would be more liquid than the 
underlying market, the ETF would recognize the price prior to the underlying market. 
The underlying security will recognize the new fundamental value with a delay. 
 
Figure 5  Fundamental shock with price discovery in the ETF (Adapted from Ben-
David et al., 2012) 
If the second theory would be the case, that would mean that the liquidity shock would 
hit the underlying security anyway, even if there would be no ETFs. The hypothesis of 
this study, however, is that the shock propagations emerging from the ETFs may be de-
stabilizing for the underlying securities. In the second theory this would not be the case 
since shocks would hit the securities with or without ETFs.  
 Ben-David et al. (2012) argued that if the first theory presented in Figure 4 would be 
true, the underlying securities would initially face positive price pressure but later revert 
to the fundamental value. This was found to be the case and shocks were discovered to 
propagate through the arbitrage mechanism. 
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The fist assumption provided by Ben-David et al. (2012) and explained above is in line 
with the limits-to-arbitrage model by Greenwood (2005). The ETF and the underlying 
securities have identical fundamentals and are correlated. In the presence of limited arbi-
trage, arbitrageurs require a compensation for accommodating the demand shock and for 
taking on increased risk. As per Greenwood (2005) the demand shock will cause an in-
crease in the price of the ETF (first assumption). Since the underlying securities are cor-
related to the ETF, arbitrageurs will use the securities as a hedge driving up the price of 
the underlying securities and therefore NAV (second assumption). In a long run the prices 
will revert to the equilibrium (third assumption). 
As stated earlier, the impact that individual investors have on assets should be negli-
gible but if the trading of noise traders is systematic and correlated enough, they could 
have an impact on the securities. Ownership of ETFs in shares may inject a new layer of 
noise to the underlying securities through the non-fundamental demand shocks. The 
prices ETFs that are affected by noise-based liquidity shocks start to diverge from NAV. 
Arbitrageurs will start to exploit the price difference and bring the price of the ETF back 
to its fundamental value.  
However, as explained by Ben-David et al. (2012), before the price of the ETF reverts 
to its fundamental value, the underlying securities will be affected by the noise through 
arbitrage. Since arbitrage is limited, i.e. it’s risky, arbitrageurs demand compensation for 
the risk that they take while taking part in the arbitrage process. Risk-averse arbitrageurs 
will use the underlying securities as a hedge and transmit the liquidity shock into them. 
Over time both prices will revert to their fundamental levels. However, if these non-fun-
damental liquidity shocks are frequent enough, ETFs may cause a new layer of risk to the 
underlying securities. 
2.3 Earlier empirical studies on the effect of ETFs on stock market 
Earlier empirical studies have found wide evidence that institutions have a role in non-
fundamental demand shocks that affect asset prices because of their investors. In addition, 
recent empirical literature has studied the effect of ETFs on asset prices. However, there 
is only a limited number of studies made on how ETFs affect the volatility of the under-
lying securities, especially in markets outside of the US. In this section, we are going to 
discuss recent empirical literature related to this study.  
The main influence for this study is a paper by Ben-David et al. (2018) that discovered 
that stocks that have a significant ETF ownership experience substantially higher volatil-
ity than stocks with small ETF ownership. The study suggests that the arbitrage between 
the exchange-traded funds and the underlying assets add a new layer of trading to the 
stocks held by these ETFs. Trading shocks that occur in the ETF market are transmitted 
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to the underlying securities through the arbitrage process leading to growth in non-fun-
damental volatility in the securities. In addition, Ben-David et al. (2018) argue that the 
increase in volatility appears to introduce undiversifiable risk in prices because stocks 
with high ETF ownership earn a significant risk premium. Ultimately, the evidence sug-
gests that ETFs are a new source of systematic risk. The study was made using data from 
the US market. 
Volatility has been found to increase also in other markets after the introduction of 
ETFs. Lin and Chiang (2005) studied the change of volatility if the Taiwanese market 
after the introduction of the first ETF. The study demonstrated that the volatility of the 
underlying stocks did increase after the establishment of the first ETF. The volatility did 
not differ among different size categories but volatility in the financial and electronical 
sector increased significantly while volatility in the mixed sector reduced. 
Even the real estate sector has found to be affected by ETFs. ETFs have made the real 
estate sector more accessible, but the introduction of real estate ETFs were discovered to 
significantly increase volatility in the underlying real estate stocks. Curcio et al. (2012) 
found that leveraged ETFs tied to the Dow Jones US Real Estate and Financial Indices 
caused the most significant volatility increase tripling the volatility of the underlying se-
curities. Traditional ETFs on the other hand caused a 70 percent increase in volatility. No 
other external events were found that could have attributed to the increased volatility. 
Ben-David et al. (2018) among others have stated that the rise in volatility may be 
caused by the commonality of fund flows that cannot be explained by the fundamentals 
of the stock. A large body of literature in fact show that flow-induced trading has a non-
fundamental effect on asset prices. Vayanos and Woolley (2013) suggest that flows of 
investors of mutual funds push prices away from fundamental value. In addition, the study 
found that flows generate momentum, reversal and comovement of share prices.  
Coval and Stafford (2007) studied institutional price pressure in equity markets by 
studying mutual fund flow-induced trading. The study showed that funds experiencing 
large outflows tend to decrease their existing position and thus adding pressure on the 
prices of the underlying securities. Similarly, funds experiencing significant inflows in-
crease their position putting positive price pressure on the securities. Therefore, if flow-
driven purchases or sales are widespread, these forced transactions result in institutional 
price pressure. 
Basak and Pavlova (2013) suggest that institutions care about their performance re-
lated to a certain index. In addition, institutional investors tend to tilt their portfolios to-
wards the benchmark index resulting in an increased price pressure on the index stocks. 
The study shows that institutional investors demand for more risky securities compared 
to retail investors and thus amplify the volatility of index stocks. 
Anton and Polk (2014) show that shared ownership by an active mutual fund cause 
excess comovement in the underlying shares. In other words, shares are connected with 
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each other through mutual fund owners that they have in common. Further, stocks that 
are connected by their mutual fund ownership covary more while controlling for system-
atic return factors and sector similarity among other factors. Therefore, the degree of 
shared ownership in the shares forecast cross-sectional variation in return correlation.  
Finally, Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) studied stock price fragility and showed that 
volatility and comovement can be forecasted with asset fragility. The study suggests that 
assets are fragile when ownership is concentrated or when owners experience correlated 
liquidity shocks. The study was made using mutual fund ownership of US stocks. 
Because of the unprecedented growth of the ETF industry, ETFs have gained a lot of 
interest from academics who have been arguing whether ETFs have a destabilizing effect 
on the securities market. Agarwal et al. (2018) examined the impact of ETFs on the sim-
ilarity of liquidity in the underlying stocks, while controlling for other institutional inves-
tors. The results showed that ETF ownership indicate a significant increase in common-
ality and that greater arbitrage activity is associated with an even larger commonality 
effect in share liquidity. The study concluded that ETFs may reduce the ability of inves-
tors to diversify liquidity risk. 
Da and Shive (2018) too suggested that ETF ownership could lead to a larger com-
monality. The study provides empirical evidence that ETF arbitrage could be a new 
source of return comovement as the arbitrage activity between the ETF and the under-
lying portfolio could generate non-fundamental shocks to the stocks they hold. The anal-
ysis showed that ETF turnover is an important determinant of the comovement and that 
ETF-induced return comovement could be excessive, as there seemed to be a sub-sequent 
price reversal in both fund level and stock level. However, Da and Shive (2018) pointed 
out that ETFs do have some benefits as they provide a cheaper and more efficient way to 
diversify a portfolio but at the same time the excessive comovement among the asset may 
be costly to many investors, both institutional and individual. 
Leippold et al. (2016) studied if stock return correlations could be driven by trading in 
index-tracking products, in addition to the correlation in the fundamentals of the stocks 
as traditional financial theory suggests. The index-tracking products used in the study 
were ETFs and futures. The results implied that index-trading activity can explain a large 
part of the time variation in stock return correlation. In addition, a surprising implication 
of the study was that index demand shocks may affect the correlation of non-index stocks 
even though index stocks were found more sensitive to shocks. Furthermore, ETFs were 
found to have a stronger impact on correlations than futures.  
In conclusion, recent empirical studies suggest that institutional ownership in shares 
may imply that fund flows cause pressure on the share prices and may increase comove-
ment in the underlying stocks. 
However, several studies researching the relation between institutional ownership and 
the underlying stock have found that institutional investors often act as liquidity providers 
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for the underlying stock (Dang, 2018; Rubin and Smith, 2009). Rubin and Smith (2009) 
suggests that in addition to added trading volume, institutional investors increase compe-
tition among informed investors leading to a more efficient market.  
Dang (2018) studied the effect globally in both developed and emerging countries and 
found that institutional ownership is positively related to share liquidity. This effect was 
found to be even stronger among stocks in less evolved and liquid markets.  
Agarwal (2007) on the other hand found that institutional ownership has a non-linear 
effect on liquidity. When institutional ownership is moderate, they seem to act as liquidity 
providers but as the ownership exceeds 40%, information asymmetry takes place and the 
effect weakens.  
As the results of earlier empirical studies show, the results do not seem to be com-
pletely consistent with each other, but some important factors can be found that may af-
fect the results. First, the effect that a certain ownership may have on the underlying share 
is dependent on the composition of the ownership. Different forms of ownership may 
have an opposite effect on the shares (Dang, 2018). Second, the market of trading affects 
the impact of the ownership. As studies have been made in other less evolved and less 
liquid markets than the US, the results received have often been different. Third, the level 
of certain ownership seems to affect the impact that the ownership has on a share as 
Agarwal (2007) demonstrated.
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1Nasdaq OMX Nordix 120 included 102 companies on March 16, 2019 when the data was retrieved from 
nasdaqomxnordic.com. It was noted that including only current companies included in the index to the study would 
expose to survivorship bias, but the effect was estimated to be negligible. 
 
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
The study focuses on Nordic listed companies that are included in the Nasdaq OMX Nor-
dic 120 index1. The companies included are presented in the Appendix D. This specific 
index was chosen since it provides a broad sample of publicly listed companies in the 
Nordics. One share, Ericsson B, was excluded from the study due to its abnormal trading 
behavior. For example, in some months the share was traded only on one day. Of the 
remaining companies 55 (54%) are Swedish, 21 (21%) Finnish and 26 (26%) Danish. 
The time frame for the study is 10 years from 1.1.2009 to 31.12.2018 and the frequency 
of the data collected is monthly. Therefore, each company will have 120 time series data 
points if the company has been listed throughout the time period. In total, 11 companies 
were listed during the time frame and have therefore incomplete time series data. The 
companies listed during the time frame of the study are added to the data as they were 
listed.  
The data used for this study is collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon database to form 
a panel data. Due to unobserved data, e.g. for companies listed during the time frame, the 
panel data is unbalanced. ETF ownership data was collected by retrieving fund ownership 
data from Thomson Reuters Eikon database and sorting ETF owners from the list of fund 
shareholders by the terms “ETF”, “Exchange-traded fund” or “Indeksiosuusrahasto” 
(Seligson’s exchange-traded fund). During the collection  of the data, Seligson’s ETF was 
the only one that included the word “Indeksiosuusrahasto” in Thomson Reuters Eikon 
database.  
Other forms of ownership were collected from Fund Ownership History Reports. Other 
daily stock market data used in this study was also retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon 
database as either cross-sectional data from the last day of the month or average data from 
the trading days of the month. All data used in the study, excluding company name and 
sector, is time series data. 
In this study, the focus will be on the companies that are owned by ETFs and how the 
shares of these companies are affected by ETFs. The investment style or behavior of spe-
cific ETFs will not be addressed. Therefore, only equity ETFs will be included in the 
study and ETF derivatives will not. ETFs will be considered as a group of institutional 
investors and studying of individual ETFs will not be included in the study. 
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3.2 Methodology and sample characteristics 
3.2.1 ETF ownership and share volatility 
The first research question I am going to address is how ETF ownership affects share 
volatility. The research problem was largely influenced by the study made by Ben-David 
et al. (2018) who focused on the US market only. However, the Nordic markets differ 
significantly from the US market for example in terms of size and liquidity. The rising 
trend of ETFs has landed in the Nordics too and therefore it is important to understand 
the implications that ETFs may have on the financial markets in a smaller and more illiq-
uid market. Since no studies have been made on the subject using data from Nordic coun-
tries, I am going to extend the study made by Ben-David et al. (2018) in order to provide 
new information on how ETFs affect the volatility of the underlying stock. 
The study is quantitative and applies regression analysis to examine the dependence 
of ETF ownership on volatility. I conduct my main test of how ETF ownership, the frac-
tion of shares owned by ETFs, is correlated with stock level volatility. A panel data is 
constructed to capture both time and individual companies for more efficient estimates. 
We run a regression on panel data, controlling for month and share fixed effect using the 
following model: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 × 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
(5) 
where 𝛼 is constant, 𝛽 is the coefficient, ETF ownership is either ETF ownership %, ETF 
ownership flow or weighted ETF turnover %, controls are the controlling variables, fixed 
effects are company fixed effects and month fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
Stock level volatility, the dependent variable in the model, is calculated using daily 
returns of each stock in a given month, 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,t =  √
1
𝐷𝑖𝑡
 ∑ (𝑟𝑖𝑑 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅
𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑖=1 )
2 , (6) 
where Dit is the number of days for which data is available for stock i in month t, r is the 
return of stock i on day d and ?̅? is the return of stock i in month t. 
In order to calculate the ETF ownership percentage, the number of shares held by ETFs 
was divided by the number of shares outstanding on that same date. The frequency of the 
ownership data is monthly and therefore of the frequency data for the regression is 
monthly as well. All data is either a cross section on the last day of the month or an 
average figure of the data collected during that month. 
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ETF ownership of stock i in month t is defined as the number of shares held by ETFs 
at the end of the month divided by shares outstanding at the end of the month, 
 
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 % =  
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑗,𝑡
𝐽
j=1
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
 , (7) 
where J is the number of ETFs holding stock i.  A summary of annual ETF holdings in 
the shares included in out sample is shown in Table 1.   
In addition to ETF ownership level, we construct two alternative measures of ETF 
ownership: weighted ETF turnover percentage and ETF ownership flow percentage. ETF 
ownership flow captures if the change in volatility is not only caused by the level of ETF 
ownership but rather by the in and out flows of ETF ownership i.e. creation and redemp-
tion activity. ETF turnover % on the other hand is the ratio of how many times the fund 
manager has turned the whole portfolio on an annual basis. This variable is calculated as 
a weighted ETF turnover in order to make it proportional to the ETF ownership.  
ETF ownership flows are calculated as follows 
 
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑝 %𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 %𝑖,𝑡−1
), (8) 
where ETF ownership %i, t is the ETF ownership percentage on the last day of month 
t and ETF ownership %i, t-1 is the ETF ownership percentage on the last day of the previ-
ous month. In this study ETF turnover % has been calculated for the last twelve months 
as weighted arithmetic mean and multiplying this by the total ETF ownership % in order 
to capture the weight that the ETF turnover would have on the share: 
 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 %𝑗,𝐿𝑇𝑀
= ∑ 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
× ∑ (
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 %𝑗,𝐿𝑇𝑀 × 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 %𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
)
𝐽
𝑗=1
  , 
(9) 
where j is the ETF holding share i at time t. In order to control for other institutional 
investors, hedge fund ownership and index fund ownership are controlled for in the re-
gression. Similarly to ETFs, hedge funds are also likely to trade at a higher frequency and 
therefore should be controlled for. Both index and hedge fund ownership are calculated 
in the same way as ETF ownership. To illustrate the increasing importance of ETFs, I 
present statistics in Table 2 to compare other forms of institutional ownership to ETF 
ownership. 
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Table 2 
Institutional ownership holdings 
This table presents the development of three different institutional ownership holdings between 2009-2018. Each holding is the year end cross-sectional ownership percentage. Each institutional 
holding, ETF ownership, index fund ownership and hedge fund ownership is calculated as the number of shares held by each fund divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
OMX Nordic 120 
 ETF   Index Funds   Hedge Funds 
Year 
Number of 
Companies 
Percentage 
of Market 
Cap 
Market Cap 
(EURm) 
Market Cap 
divided by 
Companies 
  
Percentage 
of Market 
Cap 
Market Cap 
(EURm) 
Market Cap 
divided by 
Companies 
  
Percentage of 
Market Cap 
Market Cap 
(EURm) 
Market Cap 
divided by 
Companies 
2018 101 2.07% 127,668 1,252   6.38% 435,672 4,271   0.43% 30,350 298 
2017 98 1.81% 140,680 1,421   5.88% 460,846 4,655   0.38% 35,321 357 
2016 97 1.39% 90,606 925   4.56% 325,451 3,321   0.44% 33,341 340 
2015 94 1.42% 84,715 892   3.93% 258,860 2,725   0.32% 24,051 253 
2014 93 1.34% 69,043 734   3.14% 201,549 2,144   0.24% 16,530 176 
2013 90 1.13% 74,536 819   2.78% 157,385 1,730   0.18% 12,373 136 
2012 90 0.88% 49,972 549   2.29% 112,014 1,231   0.27% 9,544 105 
2011 89 0.86% 34,436 383   2.17% 87,813 976   0.29% 7,085 79 
2010 87 0.68% 34,882 396   2.23% 103,780 1,179   0.35% 9,955 113 
2009 86 0.62% 22,584 260   2.24% 79,746 917   0.34% 9,319 107 
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During the ten-year-period, ETF ownership in Nordic shares has increased by 234% 
from 0.62% in 2009 to 2.07% in 2018. Index funds, which are the closest substitutes for 
ETFs since ETF holdings are included in the index fund holdings, has increased nearly at 
the same rate as ETF holdings. Index fund holdings have grown 185% from 2.24% to 
6.38%. Hedge fund ownership has also grown during the time period but at a more mod-
erate rate than index or exchange-traded fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership has 
grown only 26% during the ten-year period.   
A lot of the growth of ETF ownership in shares can be explained by the increased 
number of ETFs in the market investing in Nordic companies but ETFs have also in-
creased their stakes in the companies. This notion can be confirmed visually in Figure 6 
and, in addition, Table 2 presents how the market capitalization owned by ETFs has 
grown significantly over the years.  
 
Figure 6 Development of ETF ownership in the Nordics 2009-2018 
Even though the growth of ETF ownership has been great during this time frame, it is 
not nearly at the same level as it is in the US. Comparing this data with the data from the 
study made by Ben-David et al. (2018) ETF ownership percentage is much lower in the 
Nordic than in the US. In 2015 Ben-David et al. (2018) reported the ETF ownership to be 
7.48% whereas in the Nordics it was 1.42% during the same time.  
In order to capture the true effect that ETF’s have on volatility, the regression controls 
for other factors that may affect daily share volatility. In Table 3, it can be observed that 
company market capitalization is highly correlated with share volatility. Therefore, it can 
be interpreted that larger and more established companies are usually included in more 
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indices than smaller companies, leading to a higher ETF ownership. Further, larger com-
panies tend to be more liquid than smaller, less traded companies.  
In order to control for these factors, we add controls measuring company size and share 
liquidity. Size effect is captured by the logarithmic market capitalization and liquidity 
effect by trading volume percentage, Amihud ratio (2002) and bid-ask-spread percentage. 
All of these factors are calculated as monthly averages prior to the day ETF ownership is 
calculated.  
Trading volume is calculated based on the number of shares traded during the past 
month that is standardized by the number of shares outstanding, as follows 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 %𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑚
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
, 
(10) 
where number of shares of company i traded during month m is divided by shares 
outstanding on the last day of month t. Bid-ask spread is the amount that ask price exceeds 
the bid price. Bid-ask spread captures market liquidity as the spread reflects the trading 
cost. Bid-ask spread percentage is calculated as follows  
 𝐵𝑖𝑑 − 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 %𝑖𝑡 =
𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
, (11) 
where stock i’s bid-ask spread percentage at time t is the difference of ask and bid 
price divided by ask price. 
Amihud ratio is an illiquidity measure that gives the price impact of order flows (Ami-
hud, 2002). Our study calculates a monthly Amihud ratio as follows  
 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑚 =
1
𝐷𝑖𝑚
∑
|𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑑|
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑚
𝑖=1
, (12) 
where Dim is the number of days for which data is available for stock i in month m,      
VOLDimd is the trading volume in euros for stock i in month m on day d and Rimd is the 
return of stock i in month m on day d. As shown in Equation 12, Amihud ratio calculates 
the impact that trading volatility has on share price. As the ratio increases, the illiquidity 
of the stock increases. 
In addition, the regression will control for other factors that may affect share volatility 
such as inverse share price, book to market ratio, gross profitability (gross income scaled 
by total assets, as in Novy-Marx (2013)) and skewness. Inverse share price is used instead 
of just share price due to the inverse relationship between stock prices and volatility. 
Month and stock fixed effects are controlled for since the amount of ETF holdings have 
increased significantly over the period and some industries and companies may have been 
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more popular or unpopular over time. Table 3 summarizes the dependent and controlling 
variables used in the regression.  
There is no denying that ETFs have become more popular and significant in the Nordic 
market during the past ten years. However, the impact that they may have on the market 
is still widely unclear. In order to address the main research question, if ETF ownership 
has increased volatility, the volatility of each share listed on OMX Nordic 120 index and 
for each year during the ten-year period was calculated. Volatility was calculated as mar-
ket weighted volatility of a portfolio constructed of shares included in the study for each 
month. The results are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7  Portfolio volatility of shares included in OMX Nordic 120 2009-2018 
 
Even though several studies conducted have reported that share volatility has increased 
during the past years (Washer et al., 2016), no such claim can be done from the Nordic 
market. There seem to be a clear downward trend in the market for volatility in the same 
period where ETF ownership has grown significantly. In fact, the correlation between 
ETF ownership and volatility is significantly negative during this time period as shown 
in Table 3, Panel B. No definite conclusions can be made from only this relation, but the 
initial data does not support the notion that the increasing ETF ownership has destabilized 
the Nordic markets.
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Table 3 
Panel data description 
This table presents the panel data summary. The table includes the number of observations, the mean of the variable, standard deviation, minimum, median, maximum, skewness and kurtosis. Daily 
stock volatility is the monthly average daily volatility of each share calculated from the previous month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson 
Reuters -database, on the last day of each month. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. 
Index fund ownership is the percentage of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of 
the stock held by hedge funds on the last day of each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. 1/Price is the inverse share price during the last day 
of the month. Amihud ratio is calculated as Amihud (2002). Bid-ask-spread is calculated as the average bid-ask-spread of a stock during the previous month. Book to Market is the book to market 
ratio of each company on the last day of each month. 12-month return is the return of the stock during the previous year. Trading volume is the average daily trading volume of each share during 
the previous month. Gross profitability is calculated as Novy-Marx (2013). Skewness is the average daily skewness of each share during the previous month. Number of ETFs is the number of 
individual ETFs holding a share of a company. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF flow is the logged change in ETF ownership during a month. 
Panel A: Panel data summary 
 N Mean SD Min Median Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Daily stock volatility (%) 11,279 1.755 0.887 0.190 1.544 14.095 2.294 11.046 
ETF ownership (%) 11,278 1.235 1.312 0.000 0.869 15.104 2.953 15.353 
Index fund ownership (%) 11,279 3.563 2.952 0.000 2.880 22.767 1.704 4.280 
Hedge fund ownership (%) 11,279 0.341 0.886 0.000 0.089 10.932 5.540 35.559 
log(Market Cap EURm) 11,278 9.683 0.517 7.435 9.641 11.044 -0.095 0.030 
1/Price 11,278 0.030 0.083 0.000 0.010 3.678 20.713 710.278 
Amihud ratio 11,278 0.323 4.462 0.000 0.038 339.050 60.595 4095.594 
Bid-ask spread 11,279 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.105 11.053 187.569 
Book to Market 11,279 0.522 0.605 -0.097 0.364 12.701 5.491 62.076 
Past 12 month returns (%) 11,145 16.605 41.185 -92.672 12.703 657.143 3.131 28.000 
Trading volume (%) 11,278 0.452 0.551 0.005 0.301 11.448 5.623 58.837 
Gross profitablity (%) 11,279 29.287 25.449 -1.032 24.917 147.708 1.597 3.447 
Skewness 11,278 0.090 0.883 -4.074 0.100 3.992 -0.191 2.698 
Number of ETFs  11,278 63.204 59.161 0.000 39.000 397.000 1.184 0.892 
ETF turnover (%) 11,278 0.010 0.016 0.000 0.005 0.413 2.458 11.976 
Log(ETF flow) 11,037 0.009 0.110 -2.279 0.005 1.958 0.710 104.603 
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Panel B: Panel data correlations 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Volatility (1) 1,000                
ETF ownership (2) -0,138 1,000               
Number of ETF owners (3) -0,201 0,499 1,000              
Index fund ownership (4) -0,103 0,485 0,551 1,000             
Hedge fund ownership (5) 0,030 -0,045 0,017 0,068 1,000            
Volume (6) 0,295 0,160 -0,195 -0,049 0,026 1,000           
Bid-ask-spread (7) 0,188 -0,144 -0,260 -0,076 0,161 0,177 1,000          
Amihud ratio (8) 0,151 -0,096 -0,107 -0,125 -0,045 -0,069 0,147 1,000         
Log(Market Cap) (9) -0,239 0,119 0,585 0,249 -0,060 -0,293 -0,249 -0,065 1,000        
1/Price (10) 0,232 0,010 -0,045 -0,064 -0,052 0,084 0,196 0,689 -0,166 1,000       
12-month return (11) -0,178 -0,021 -0,092 -0,042 0,045 0,035 0,037 -0,055 -0,031 -0,056 1,000      
Book to Market ratio (12) 0,194 -0,121 -0,143 -0,071 -0,047 -0,032 0,147 0,285 -0,126 0,414 -0,161 1,000     
Gross profitability (13) -0,032 0,080 0,048 -0,025 -0,044 0,063 -0,009 -0,077 0,021 -0,036 -0,004 -0,396 1,000    
Skewness (14) 0,031 -0,046 -0,094 -0,068 0,025 0,031 0,033 0,022 -0,073 0,019 0,087 0,006 -0,008 1,000   
ETF turnover % (15) -0,138 0,096 0,141 0,075 0,002 -0,058 -0,097 -0,049 0,072 -0,057 0,053 -0,080 0,043 -0,014 1,000  
ETF flow (16) -0,032 -0,091 -0,014 -0,017 0,018 -0,005 0,007 0,010 -0,019 0,017 0,016 0,010 -0,002 0,000 0,032 1,000 
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3.2.2 ETF ownership and share liquidity 
There is an ongoing academic debate on how ETF ownership affects the liquidity of the 
underlying securities. While only few studies have been made on the link between ETF 
ownership and stock liquidity, the connection between ETF ownership and bond liquidity 
has been a more studied subject. However, the results are not consistent. While Dann-
hauser (2017) argues that higher ETF ownership is associated with lower liquidity in in-
vestment-grade bonds, another study by Nam (2017) found that bonds included in ETFs 
experience improvements in their liquidity.  
Hamm (2010) investigated the effect of ETFs on the liquidity of individual stocks. The 
study found that the availability of ETFs as an alternative trading option is positively 
associated with share illiquidity. The reasoning behind these results come from prior an-
alytical studies suggesting that uninformed investors prefer investing in diversified ETF’s 
rather than individual stocks to avoid trading against informed investors (adverse selec-
tion). Consequently, individual stocks become less liquid due to this migration of inves-
tors from individual stocks to ETFs.  
In this study, the connection between ETF ownership and share liquidity is investi-
gated using three variables to depict liquidity: share turnover, bid-ask-spread and Amihud 
ratio. I run a regression to measure the effect of ETF ownership on liquidity while con-
trolling for several factors that could affect the liquidity of a share in the following way: 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 × 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
(13) 
𝐵𝑖𝑑 − 𝑎𝑠𝑘 − 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 +  𝛽 × 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
(14) 
and 
𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 +  𝛽 × 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
(15) 
Controlling variables in all regressions include other forms of institutional ownership 
such as index fund and hedge fund ownership in order to specify which form of ownership 
is most associated with the dependent variables. In addition, several other controlling 
variables, that could affect share liquidity are included such as size, profitability, returns, 
book to market ratio, and free float percentage.  
39 
 
3.2.3 ETF ownership and return comovement 
Da and Shive (2018) argued that along with information, ETFs may transmit non-funda-
mental shocks into the underlying shares. Demand in the ETF leads to price pressure in 
the stock as arbitrageurs take opposite positions in the ETF and the underlying stock. As 
a result, the underlying shares may start to comove more than they should based on their 
fundamentals. Therefore, arbitrageurs that are supposed to enforce price efficiency might 
cause excess comovement, consistent with the views of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who 
studied the limits of arbitrage, and Hong et al. (2012), who argued that the prices of highly 
shorted stocks are excessively sensitive to shocks compared to stocks with little short 
interest. Da and Shive (2018) suggested that while ETFs have only little discretion in 
deciding when and what to trade, ETF arbitrage is more likely than any other type of 
correlated order flow to drive return comovement among its underlying stocks. 
In order to study the effect of ETF ownership on return comovement in the Nordic 
markets, I first construct a measure of comovement as Parsley and Popper (2017) and 
examine the change in comovement over time. Then I partially replicate the stock level 
tests made by Da and Shive (2018) to understand the relation of comovement with ETF 
ownership and if the price movement if excessive. 
To capture the return comovement of the shares over time, I use a model free comove-
ment measure by Parsley and Popper (2017). I start by decomposing a portfolio with N 
firms and calculate the market return, rm, with equal weights, 
 𝑟𝑚 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 , (16) 
where wi is the weight of share i. Then I decompose the portfolio’s return variance based 
on sum of two parts. The first part consists of the individual return variances and the 
second part consists of their covariances,  
 
𝜎𝑚
2 =
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝑖
2 +
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ 𝜎𝑖,𝑗
2
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑖≠𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
.
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (17) 
The pure comovement is captured by the second part of the equation. Next, I will look 
at the counterparts of each of these terms. I denote sample value of each individual return 
variance by 𝑠𝑖
2 and sample value of each covariance by 𝑐𝑖
2. Then I denote the correspond-
ing average values by 𝑠2 and 𝑐2, where 
 𝑠2 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1       and     𝑐
2 =
1
𝑁2−𝑁
∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑗,𝑖
2𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 . (18) 
And with these two averages I will get the sample portfolio variance, 
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 ?̂?𝑚
2 =  
1
𝑁
𝑠2 +
𝑁−1
𝑁
𝑐2. (19) 
Finally, I will get the comovement using 𝑐2 as a share of the average individual variance, 
𝑠2,  
 
𝑐2
𝑠2
=
𝑁
𝑁 − 1
 (
?̂?𝑚
2
𝑠2
−
1
𝑁
). (20) 
Using Equation 20 to capture share comovement over time, I find that comovement 
has decreased over the ten-year time frame. The results are shown in Figure 8. The com-
mon belief is that ETF ownership, and more broadly, the rise of index investing has in-
creased comovement of underlying shares, cannot be confirmed based on this data.  How-
ever, comovement has decreased over the years when ETF and index fund ownership has 
increased significantly.  
 
Figure 8  Fitted share co-movement in the Nordics 2009-2018 
To further understand the effect of ETF ownership on comovement, I replicate in some 
parts the study made by Da and Shive (2015) on the effect of ETF activity on return 
comovement. Da and Shive concluded in their stock level test that ETF ownership causes 
excessive comovement in return comovement.  
First, I measure the relationship between several measures of ETF activity and beta, 
which is the measure of comovement. Beta is calculated as the coefficient of excess 
monthly stock return and excess monthly market return. Market return is constructed from 
a value weighted portfolio of shares included in the OMX Nordic 120 index. I also add 
index fund and hedge fund ownership to control for other forms of institutional 
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ownership. Other controlling variables included logged market capitalization, trading vol-
ume, and book to market ratio.  
Second, I measure if the price movement is excessive. This is measured by lagged 
market betas over time horizons, t-1, t-2, t-10 and t-30 days. If the movement would be 
excessive, the movement would revert over time.  
3.2.4 ETF ownership and excess returns 
The study by Ben-David et al. (2018) concluded that a potential implication of ETFs ef-
fect on stock volatility is that ETF ownership introduces a new source of risk in the un-
derlying shares. ETFs invest across all stocks and therefore the risk caused by ETFs is 
not necessarily diversifiable. A natural question then arose, that if stocks owned by ETFs 
pay a premium to compensate for the additional risk. Even though it was found that ETF-
induced shocks cancel out over time because of mean reversion, investors may still re-
quire a reward for carrying this additional volatility. 
In order to test whether higher ETF ownership induce a premium return, I conduct a 
similar study as Ben-David et al. (2018) to examine the relationship between ETF own-
ership and returns. I build a quantile regression based on ETF ownership percentage. In 
the regression low portfolio refers to 0.1 quantile; 2, 3 and 4 refer to 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 
respectively and high to 0.9. After allocating each company in each month into these five 
portfolios, I calculate the excess returns for each company in the previous month. The 
results of the of the regression is shown in Table 12, Panel A. 
In Table 12, Panel B the raw returns of a high-minus-low ETF ownership portfolio and 
company specific alphas are presented. The dependent variable is constructed by building 
two portfolios based on ETF ownership percentage and by subtracting the returns of the 
low ETF ownership portfolio from the high ETF ownership portfolio. The high-minus-
low ETF ownership portfolio is then regressed against company specific alphas. I calcu-
late the alphas for all the companies for each month during 2009-2018 in the following 
way: 
 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 = 𝑅𝑖 −  𝑅𝑓 − 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 × (𝑅𝑚 −  𝑅𝑓), (21) 
where Ri is the return of the company during the month, Rf is the risk-free rate and Rm is 
the market return. Beta is calculated by dividing monthly company return by monthly 
market return. 
In Figure 9, I have presented the development of average monthly alphas over the time 
frame. As the downward slope exhibits, alphas have decreased over time as ETF owner-
ship has increased. These results are consistent with our assumption that ETF ownership 
would decrease the returns as the volatility decreases. Decreasing alphas may also 
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indicate that the market has become more efficient over time through improved infor-
mation efficiency. 
 
Figure 9 Development of alphas over time  
Fama and French (2015) European five factors (MKTRF, HML, SMB, RMW, CMA) 
are used as controlling variables as well as momentum. Fama and French five factor es-
timates are retrieved from the Fama/French data library for each month from January 
2009 to December 2018.  
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 ETF ownership and share volatility 
In this section, I am going to present the results of the main research question, how ETF 
ownership affects the volatility of underlying shares. I find evidence that supports neither 
the liquidity buffer hypothesis nor the price discovery hypothesis. In fact, ETF ownership 
is found to be negatively correlated with volatility and the relation is significant. 
Similarly to the research made by Ben-David et al. (2018), I run a regression to meas-
ure the relationship between ETF ownership and daily stock volatility. The results shown 
in Table 3 suggest a completely opposite result from the study made by Ben-David et al. 
(2018). I find that ETF ownership is negatively and significantly correlated with daily 
stock volatility at 0.1% significance level. Since ETF ownership is included in the index 
fund ownership, and therefore are highly correlated with each other, index fund owner-
ship is not significantly correlated with share volatility when ETF ownership is included 
in the regression. However, when ETF ownership is excluded from the regression, index 
fund ownership becomes significantly and negatively correlated with share volatility. The 
results suggest that all forms of institutional ownership included in the regression, ETF, 
index fund and hedge fund ownership, decrease volatility in the underlying shares. These 
findings suggest that institutional investors tend to absorb some of the illiquidity in the 
market causing the volatility to decrease in the underlying shares.  
Both ETF turnover percentage and ETF ownership flow are also negatively correlated 
with daily stock volatility at a 5% significance level. In other words, ETF ownership level 
has the most significant effect on daily stock volatility. However, the regression including 
ETF ownership flow receives the highest R-squared level, indicating that it would be the 
best fitting model. The reason behind this result may come from the fact that ETF own-
ership level is already included in index fund ownership and is already taken into account 
in that variable.  
In Table 5, the data has been split into subsamples. Columns 1-6 presents the same 
regression results as in Table 3, columns 12-14, but split into two time frames: 2009-2014 
and 2015-2018. There seem to be some difference between the two time frames in ETF 
ownership indicating that the effect would have been slightly stronger in the earlier time 
frame. However, the difference in very small and no major conclusions can be made on 
it. In columns 7-10, the data has been split into four subsamples based on the level of ETF 
ownership. Bottom 25% presents the companies that have the smallest ETF ownership 
and top 25% presents the companies with the highest ETF ownership respectively. Bot-
tom 50% and top 50% presents the top and bottom half of the companies based on ETF 
ownership. The results contain some ambiguity. Top and bottom 50% indicate that the 
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negative correlation would be stronger among companies with higher ETF ownership 
whereas top and bottom 25% indicate the opposite. It seems that the ETFs have a non-
linear effect on volatility. To a certain point of ETF ownership, ETFs tend to decrease 
volatility which after the effect dampens. Perhaps, when ETF ownership is high enough, 
the liquidity provision effect is less steep, but otherwise the rise in ETF ownership makes 
the effect stronger. This result would be in line with the findings by Agarwal (2007) who 
found that institutional ownership adds liquidity in the shares up to a certain point but 
declines after that.  
In Table 6, the same data has been divided into subsamples based on market capitali-
zation. Top 25% presents the regression using data from the largest companies based on 
market capitalization and bottom 25% presents the smallest companies respectively.  The 
results show clearly that that the liquidity buffer effect seem to be much larger for com-
panies with higher market capitalization and smaller for companies with smaller market 
capitalization. Further, the effect was found to be similar when dividing the companies 
based on the liquidity of their share. Companies with high liquidity were affected more 
by the liquidity buffer caused by ETF ownership than companies with low liquidity.  
Differing from the findings made by Ben-David et al. (2018), instead of ETF owner-
ship increasing volatility, it seems to decrease share volatility in the Nordic markets. It 
seems to have the same effect that other forms of institutional investors have on the 
shares. Instead of adding risk to the market, ETFs take away risk from the market, perhaps 
by providing liquidity. Compared to the US market, the Nordic market is highly illiquid 
due to being relatively undeveloped. The Nordic market may even be so illiquid that price 
efficiency is affected by it and normal level of trading activity may push prices from their 
fundamental value and consequently add volatility. 
Based on these findings we can reject the liquidity trading  and price discovery hy-
potheses. The findings suggest that ETFs may add liquidity into the underlying shares 
making them more efficient and consequently decrease volatility. Similar findings have 
been made when studying the impact of institutional ownership on share liquidity. 
Ownership structure and institutional ownership have been widely studied subject and 
researchers often concentrate on two alternative hypotheses: adverse selection hypothesis 
and trading hypothesis. (Rubin and Smith, 2009.) Adverse selection hypothesis suggests 
that the presence of more informed investors cause information asymmetry resulting in 
share illiquidity (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980;  Kyle, 1985). Trading hypothesis on the 
other hand suggests that competition among informed traders reduce information risk and 
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Table 4  
ETF ownership and daily stock volatility 
This table presents the stock/month panel regression measuring the effect of ETF ownership of a stock included in the OMX Nordic 120 on its volatility. Share volatility is calculated as the average 
daily volatility of each share during the month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, on the last day of each month. ETF 
turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. Index fund ownership is the percentage of stock held 
by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock held by hedge funds on the last day of each 
month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's logged market capitalization on the last day of each month. Volume is the average daily trading volume of each share during the previous month. Gross 
profitability is calculated as Novy-Marx (2013). 1/Price is the inverse share price during the last day of the month. 12-month return is the return of the stock during the previous year. Book to Market 
is the book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. Amihud ratio is calculated as Amihud (2002). Bid-ask-spread is calculated as the average bid-ask-spread of a stock during 
the previous month. Skewness is the average daily skewness of each share during the previous month. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are presented in Appendix 
A, Table 133. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the explanatory power of fixed 
effects. The sample is collected from 2009 to 2018. 
Dependent variable Volatility  
Sample  OMX Nordic 120 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
ETF ownership -0.043***  
 -0.048*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071***   -0.071*** 
 (0.007)  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.007) 
ETF turnover      
  
      -0.000*   
  
 
   
 
      (0.000)   
ETF ownership flow              -0.001*  
  
 
 
 
         (0.001)  
Index fund ownership  -0.000  0.005 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.007. -0.012** 0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Hedge fund ownership   -0.021* -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.028** -0.028** -0.024** -0.025** -0.025** -0.024** -0.034*** -0.026** 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.000) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Log(Market Cap EUR)    -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.034*** -0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volume     0.272*** 0.273*** 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.274*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.247*** 0.253*** 0.271*** 
     (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Bid-Ask Spread      0.066*** 0.040* 0.041* 0.042* 0.035. 0.038* 0.038* 0.029 0.088*** 0.038* 
      (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
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ETF ownership and daily stock volatility  - continued 
1/Price       0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.001 0.006*** 
       (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
12 month return        -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000. -0.000* -0.000. -0.000 -0.000* 
       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Amihud ratio         -0.000 -0.000. -0.000. -0.000. -0.000* 0.000*** -0.000. 
       
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book to Market          0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
       
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gross profitability           -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001. -0.004*** 
       
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Skewness            0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of observations 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,277 11,277 11,037 11,277 
R-squared 0.0032 0.0000 0.0005 0.0243 0.0551 0.0563 0.0658 0.0663 0.0663 0.0713 0.0730 0.0741 0.0668 0.0800 0.0741 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0166 -0.0199 -0.0194 0.0046 0.0360 0.0371 0.0468 0.0471 0.0471 0.0521 0.0537 0.0548 0.0473 0.060 0.0548 
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Table 5  
Subsamples - Split time and ETF ownership 
This table presents the stock/month panel regression measuring the effect of ETF ownership of a stock included in the OMX Nordic 120 on its volatility divided into subsamples based on time frame 
(columns 1-6) and ETF ownership (columns 7-10). Top 25% indicates the top quartile regarding ETF ownership and bottom 25% indicates bottom quartile respectively. Share volatility is calculated 
as the average daily volatility of each share in the previous month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, on the last day of 
each month. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. Index fund ownership is the percentage 
of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock held by hedge funds on the last 
day of each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. Volume is the average daily trading volume of each share during the previous month. Gross 
profitability is calculated as Novy-Marx (2013). 1/Price is the inverse share price during the last day of the month. 12-month return is the return of the stock during the previous year. Book to Market 
is the book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. Amihud ratio is calculated as Amihud (2002). Bid-ask-spread is calculated as the average bid-ask-spread of a stock during 
the previous month. Skewness is the average daily skewness of each share during the previous month. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance 
at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the explanatory power of fixed effects. 
Dependent variable Volatility 
Sample OMX Nordic 120 
 2009-2013 2014-2018 2009-2013 2014-2018 2009-2013 2014-2018 Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 50% Top 25% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ETF ownership -0.057*** -0.053***     -0.066*** -0.078*** -0.082*** -0.037** 
 (0.014) (0.010)     (0.020) (0.016) (0.008) (0.013) 
ETF turnover   -0.000 -0.000*       
   (0.000) (0.000)       
ETF ownership flow     -0.002* -0.000     
     (0.001) (0.001)     
Index fund ownership 0.009 -0.002 0.006 0.008 0.004 -0.110. -0.044** 0.007 0.008 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Hedge fund ownership -0.040** -0.046* -0.038** -0.045* -0.042*** -0.049* -0.108*** 0.010 -0.035*** -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.032) (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) 
Log(Market Cap EUR) -0.006*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.002. 0.005*** 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002. 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Volume 0.335*** 0.439*** 0.329*** 0.396*** 0.348*** 0.462*** 0.072*** 0.123*** 0.635*** 1.445*** 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.030) (0.024) (0.032) (0.020) (0.018) (0.025) (0.052) 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.036 -0.082 0.032 -0.074 0.084** -0.069 0.068* 0.041* 0.018 0.583*** 
 (0.024) (0.123) (0.024) (0.124) (0.026) (0.137) (0.034) (0.020) (0.060) (0.159) 
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Subsamples - continued 
1/Price 0.008*** -0.023* 0.008*** -0.027** -0.001 -0.020* 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.041*** -0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) 
12 month return -0.000. -0.000 -0.000. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Amihud ratio -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.000** 0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Book to Market 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Gross profitability -0.004** 0.002 -0.004** 0.002 -0.002. 0.002 0.000 -0.002* -0.003* -0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Skewness 0.001*** -0.000* 0.001*** -0.000* 0.001*** -0.000. 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 5,482 5,795 5,482 5,795 5,296 5,741 2,571 5,401 5,756 2,919 
R-squared 0.1187 0.0503 0.1161 0.0459 0.1168 0.0532 0.0837 0.0489 0.1810 0.2954 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0918 0.0214 0.0891 0.0169 0.0891 0.0242 0.0760 0.0161 0.1546 0.2558 
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 Table 6 
Subsamples – Market capitalization 
This table presents the stock/month panel regression measuring the effect of ETF ownership of a stock included in 
the OMX Nordic 120 on its volatility divided into subsamples based on each shares market capitalization. Top 25% 
indicates the top quartile regarding market capitalization and bottom 25% bottom quartile respectively. Share vola-
tility is calculated as the average daily volatility of each share in the previous month. ETF ownership is the percentage 
of the stock held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, on the last day of each month. Index 
fund ownership is the percentage of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is 
included in index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock held by hedge funds on the 
last day of each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. Volume is 
the average daily trading volume of each share during the previous month. Gross profitability is calculated as Novy-
Marx (2013). 1/Price is the inverse share price during the last day of the month. 12-month return is the return of the 
stock during the previous year. Book to Market is the book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each 
month. Amihud ratio is calculated as Amihud (2002). Bid-ask-spread is calculated as the average bid-ask-spread of a 
stock during the previous month. Skewness is the average daily skewness of each share during the previous month. 
Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the explanatory power of fixed effects. 
Dependent variable Volatility 
  Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 50% Top 25% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ETF ownership -0.035*** -0.047*** -0.179*** -0.246*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.020) 
Index fund ownership -0.007 -0.007 0.002** -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
Hedge fund ownership 0.021 -0.004 -0.036*** -0.031* 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) 
Log(Market Cap EUR) 0.002* 0.001. -0.005*** -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Volume 0.197*** 0.195*** 0.824*** 0.660*** 
 (0.028) (0.016) (0.035) (0.052) 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.062* 0.029 0.164*** 0.764*** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.036) (0.193) 
1/Price -0.002 -0.006*** -0.065** 0.108. 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.022) (0.056) 
12 month return -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Amihud ratio 0.000. 0.001*** -0.000 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Book to Market 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Gross profitability -0.003 -0.006*** -0.000 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Skewness 0.000*** 0.000** 0.002** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,673 5,710 5,567 2,584 
R-squared 0.1273 0.0962 0.1344 0.2632 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0734 0.0667 0.1054 0.2162 
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leads to improved information efficiency reducing transaction costs which helps share 
liquidity (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Agarwal, 2007; Foster and Viswanathan, 1996; 
Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Subrahmanyam, 1991). In this case the trading hy-
potheses seems more like probable alternative to explain the decreased volatility. 
In the following section I am going to take the trading hypothesis into further inspec-
tion, and I will study the effect of ETF ownership on liquidity of the underlying shares. 
4.2 ETF ownership and share liquidity 
In the previous section, I found that in the Nordic market, ETF ownership is positively 
correlated with daily stock volatility, meaning that ETFs make the underlying shares less 
risky. Based on the findings made in the previous section, I am going to further test the 
trading hypothesis that ETFs act as liquidity providers in the Nordic market and add com-
petition to the market and through that make it more efficient.  
Even though Hamm (2010) found a positive relationship between the percentage of 
firm shares being held by ETFs and illiquidity in the market for the underlying stock, 
based on the findings made in the previous section, I would predict the opposite. The new 
hypothesis would predict added trading volume followed by improved liquidity. 
In Table 7, I have presented the panel regression on the effect of ETF ownership on 
stock trading volume. ETF ownership was found to be significantly and positively corre-
lated with trading volume at 0.1% significance level, indicating that an increase in ETF 
ownership leads to more trading. This finding is consistent with the findings of Ben-David 
et al. (2018). In an illiquid market, which the Nordic market is often considered to be, this 
would be a positive effect since more trading could perhaps lead to a more efficient mar-
ket. Index funds are showing a similar affect that ETFs are but surprisingly hedge funds 
seem to lessen trading volume as it is negatively correlated with trading volume, even 
though hedge funds are usually considered to be of high frequency trading. 
In Table 8, the effect of ETF ownership on bid-ask-spread is presented. ETF ownership 
was found to be positively and significantly correlated with bid-ask-spread at 0.1% sig-
nificance level, meaning that the transaction costs increase with ETF ownership i.e. be-
comes more illiquid. However, ETF turnover seems to have an opposite effect,  reducing 
the bid-ask-spread. When calculating the heteroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors, the relationship between ETF ownership and bid-ask-spread is not sig-
nificantly correlated anymore, but the negative correlation between ETF turnover and 
bid-ask-spread still remains at 1% significance level. Therefore, we can conclude that at 
least ETF turnover has a positive effect on liquidity by decreasing the transaction cost 
through bid-ask-spread. 
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Table 7  
ETF ownership and trading volume 
This table presents the stock/month panel regression measuring the effect of ETF ownership of a stock included in the OMX Nordic 120 on its trading volume. Trading volume is calculated as the 
average daily shares traded divided by shares outstanding during the previous month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, 
on the last day of each month. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. Index fund 
ownership is the percentage of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock 
held by hedge funds on the last day of each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. Gross profitability is calculated as Novy-Marx (2013). 12-
month return is the return of the stock during the previous year. Book to Market is the book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. Amihud ratio is calculated as Amihud 
(2002). Bid-ask-spread is calculated as the average bid-ask-spread of a stock during the previous month. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are presented in Appendix 
A, Table 14. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the explanatory power of fixed 
effects. 
Dependent Variable: Trading volume 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
ETF ownership 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.093***   
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)   
ETF turnover          0.000  
          (0.000)  
ETF flow           0.000 
           (0.000) 
Index fund ownership  0.008** 0.008** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.007* 0.020*** 0.021*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Hedge fund ownership   -0.003 -0.012* -0.013* -0.015** -0.016** -0.016** -0.014* -0.017** -0.017** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Log(Market Cap)    -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gross profitability     -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
     (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
12-month return      0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
            
52 
 
ETF ownership and trading volume - continued 
Book-to-Market ratio       -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Amihud ratio        -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bid-ask-spread         -0.023. -0.015 -0.008 
         (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
            
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,037 
R-squared 0.0369 0.0376 0.0376 0.0705 0.0731 0.07528 0.0758 0.0783 0.0786 0.0482 0.0477 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0177 0.0183 0.0183 0.0517 0.0544 0.0564 0.0569 0.0593 0.0595 0.0286 0.0276 
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Table 8  
ETF ownership and bid-ask-spread 
This table presents the stock/month panel regression measuring the effect of ETF ownership of a stock included in the OMX Nordic 120 on its bid-ask-spread. Bid-ask-spread is calculated as the 
average bid-ask-spread of a stock during the previous month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, on the last day of 
each month. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. Index fund ownership is the 
percentage of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock held by hedge 
funds on the last day of each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. 1/Price is the inverse share price during the last day of the month. 12-month 
return is the return of the stock during the previous year. Book to Market is the book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. Free float is the percentage of shares available 
for trading in the market on the last day of the month. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are presented in Appendix A, Table 15. Standard deviation is presented in 
the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the explanatory power of fixed effects. 
Dependent variable: Bid-ask-spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ETF ownership 0.022*** 0.007. 0.008* 0.011** 0.012** 0.013** 0.013*** 0.013***   
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
ETF turnover         -0.0002***  
         (0.000)  
ETF flow          -0.000 
          (0.000) 
Index fund ownership  0.031*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hedge fund ownership   0.066*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Market cap)    -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1/Price     0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
     (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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ETF ownership and bid-as-spread – continued  
12-month return      0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book-to-market ratio       0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Free float %        0.000 0.000 -0.000 
        0.000 0.000 0.000 
           
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,119 12,119 12,119 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11,278 11.278 11,037 
R-squared 0.0029 0.0195 0.0371 0.0793 0.0959 0.0965 0.0998 0.100 0.1010 0,0927 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0155 0.0013 0.0191 0.061 0.0776 0.0781 0.0814 0.0814 0.0826 0.0833 
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Table 9 
ETF ownership and Amihud ratio 
This table presents the stock/month panel regression measuring the relationship between ETF ownership and Amihud ratio (2002), a ratio measuring illiquidity. The dependent variable Amihud ratio 
is calculated as in Amihud (2002). ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, on the last day of each month. ETF turnover is 
the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. Index fund ownership is the percentage of stock held by index 
funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock held by hedge funds on the last day of each month. 
Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. Gross profitability is calculated as Novy-Marx (2013). 12-month return is the return of the stock during the 
previous year. Book to Market is the book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. Trading volume is calculated as the average daily shares traded divided by shares outstanding 
during the previous month. Bid-ask-spread is calculated as the average bid-ask-spread of a stock during the previous month. In columns 1-11 the data has been cleaned by removing outliers. Column 
12 presents the same regression with the outliers included. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are presented in Appendix A, Table 16. Standard deviation is presented 
in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the explanatory power of fixed effects. 
Dependent Variable: Amihud ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ETF ownership -0.599*** -0.637*** -0.635*** -0.652*** -0.648*** -0.650*** -0.580*** -0.305*** -0.310***   10.332. 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)   (5.350) 
ETF turnover          -0.002**   
          (0.000)   
ETF flow           0.001  
           (0.003)  
Index fund ownership  0.098*** 0.095*** 0.046. 0.044. 0.046. 0.038 0.057** 0.042. 0.009 0.023 -1.623 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (2.995) 
Hedge fund ownership   0.138** 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.057 0.010 -0.027 -0.022 -0.004 -6.787 
   (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (6.156) 
Log(Market Cap)    -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.077*** -0.095*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -1.309*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.291) 
Gross profitability     0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.012** 0.011** 0.012** 0.006 0.802 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.591) 
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ETF ownership and Amihud ratio – continued 
12-month return      -0.003* 0.000 0.002. 0.002. 0.002* 0.002*** 0.264* 
      (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.126) 
Book-to-Market ratio       0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 2.409*** 
       (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.123) 
Trading volume        -2.731*** -2.736*** -2.860*** -3.262*** -54.290*** 
        (0.077) (0.077) (0.075) (0.082) (10.268) 
Bid-ask-spread         0.611*** 0.572*** 0.483*** 90.309*** 
         (0.104) (0.105) (0.110) (13.094) 
             
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,832 11,278 
R-squared 0.0196 0.0211 0.0219 0.1612 0.1626 0.1632 0.1978 0.2906 0.2931 0.2892 0.2910 0.0555 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0025 -0.0010 -0.0003 0.1421 0.1434 0.1439 0.1793 0.2742 0.2766 0.2725 0.2743 0.0360 
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Finally, we regress the ETF ownership against Amihud ratio (Amihud, 2002), a fre-
quently used illiquidity measure. The result of this regression is presented in Table 9. The 
first results indicated that there would be no significant correlation between the Amihud 
ratio and ETF ownership. However, I find that the data included some significant outliers. 
While the median Amihud ration in the data was 0.038, there were a few ratios that ex-
ceeded 300, due to exceptionally low trading volume on certain days. The removal of 
outliers in R is presented in the Appendix C. After removing the outliers, ETF ownership 
was found to be significantly and negatively correlated with Amihud ratio at a 0.1% sig-
nificance level, suggesting that ETF ownership improves liquidity. In addition, ETF turn-
over percentage seems to have the same effect having a negative correlation with Amihud 
ratio at a 1% significance level.  
The overall result of this section is that ETF ownership seems to add trading volume 
and it decreases Amihud ratio, i.e. make the shares more liquid. These finding support 
previous findings in this study suggesting that ETF ownership decreases daily share vol-
atility. In addition, the results seem to be consistent with the trading hypothesis. As more 
informed investors are trading in the market, the more efficient the equity market becomes 
improving liquidity. In both US and Nordic market, ETFs add a new layer of trading to 
the stock market, but the effect that the added trading has on the shares is different. As 
the Nordic market is less liquid, the fact that ETFs bring more informed investors to the 
market, result in more competition and better information efficiency in the market. 
4.3 ETF ownership and return comovement 
Da and Shive (2015) found evidence supporting that arbitrageurs can contribute to 
return comovement via ETF arbitrage. The link was found both on stock and fund level 
and the effect was stronger among small and illiquid stocks. To study the same effect on 
the Nordic market, I replicate on main parts the stock-level study conducted by Da and 
Shive (2015) to reach comparable results. I use regression to estimate the effect of differ-
ent forms of ETF activities on beta, the coefficient of the stock’s daily excess return on 
the daily market excess return.  
The results suggest that ETF ownership is negatively correlated with stock return 
comovement in the Nordic markets at a 0.1% significance level. This result is in contrast 
to the ones reported by Da and Shive (2015). In the Nordic market the level of ETF own-
ership seems to decrease return comovement whereas in the US market it adds to return 
comovement. 
If ETF ownership is negatively related to return comovement, it raises a question of if 
the decrease in ETF comovement if due to improved information efficiency and reflects 
a faster incorporation of information or does it contain excessive price movement. If the 
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price movement would be excessive, the price movements would reverse over time. In 
order to examine this effect, I use the stock’s lagged betas. The results are presented in 
Table 11 and it seems that the price movement caused by ETFs is not excessive. There 
seems to be no reversal during the thirty days that the betas have been lagged.  
Again, the results from the Nordic market is not consistent with the one’s reported 
from the US market. Da and Shive (2015) reported excessive comovement that would 
revert within two days whereas results given in this study suggests decreased comove-
ment with no reversal. 
 
 Table 10   
ETF ownership and return comovement 
This table presents the month/stock panel regression relating measures of a stock's exposure to ETF activities a meas-
ure of its comovement with the market portfolio. Beta is the coefficient of the stock's daily excess return on daily 
market excess return in that month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from 
Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, on the last day of each month. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's 
holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. Index fund own-
ership is the percentage of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in 
index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock held by hedge funds on the last day of 
each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. Book to Market is the 
book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-con-
sistent standard errors are presented in Appendix A, Table 17. The dependent variable and ownership variables are 
standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by its standard deviation. Standard deviation is presented in the 
parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the 
explanatory power of fixed effects. The sample covers the period January 2009 to December 2018.  
Dependent variable: βM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ETF ownership -0.087*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.105***   
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)   
ETF turnover        -0.010  
       (0.009)  
ETF ownership flow        -0.009 
        (0.008) 
Index fund ownership  0.056** 0.057** 0.049** 0.049** 0.050** 0.016 0.011 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Hedge fund ownership   -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.002 
   (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log(Market Cap)    -0.403*** -0.399*** -0.448*** -0.430*** -0.286*** 
    (0.051) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) 
Volume     0.787 0.609 2.310 3.723. 
     (2.001) (2.002) (1.994) (2.078) 
Book to Market      -0.066** -0.070** -0.058* 
      (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
         
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 11,278 11,278 11,278 10,856 10,856 10,856 10,857 10,637 
R-squared 0.0038 0.0046 0.0046 0.0111 0.0112 0.0119 0.0064 0.0033 
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Table 11 
Comovement with lagged betas 
This table presents the month/stock panel regression relating measures of a stock's exposure to ETF activities a meas-
ure of its comovement with the market portfolio. Beta is the coefficient of the stock's daily excess return on daily 
market excess return in that month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from 
Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, on the last day of each month. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's 
holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. Index fund own-
ership is the percentage of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in 
index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock held by hedge funds on the last day of 
each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. Book to Market is the 
book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. The dependent variable and ownership variables 
are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by its standard deviation. Standard deviation is presented in 
the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes 
the explanatory power of fixed effects. The sample covers the period January 2009 to December 2018.  
Dependent variable:  β𝑀𝑡−1   β𝑀𝑡−2   β𝑀𝑡−10   β𝑀𝑡−30 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ETF ownership -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.107*** -0.101*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Index fund ownership 0.044** 0.047** 0.040* 0.049** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Hedge fund ownership 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log(Market Cap) -0.445*** -0.451*** -0.519*** -0.464*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Volume 0.137 -0.042 -2.379 -0.893 
 (2.021) (2.013) (2.020) (2.022) 
Book to Market -0.066** -0.069** -0.066** -0.101*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
    
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 10,856 10,856 10,856 10,856 
R-squared 0.0112 0.0112 0.0134 0.0118 
4.4 ETF ownership and excess returns 
Studies researching the effect of ETF ownership have concluded that if ETF ownership 
in shares tend to add volatility in them, and shareholders should require a premium for 
the risk that they bear, even if it was only temporary. Ben-David et al. (2018) found a 
significant positive relationship between ETF ownership and excess returns confirming 
this assumption. Since this study found ETF ownership to decrease the volatility in the 
underlying shares, it would be logical that the return of shares that have a wide ETF own-
ership base would be smaller because of the decreased risk. 
The results are, as assumed, the complete opposite from the ones by Ben-David et al. 
(2018). For all quantiles, monthly excess returns are all negatively correlated with ETF 
ownership. All portfolios except the low quantile is significantly correlated at a 0.1% 
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significance level. In addition, the negative correlation in monthly excess return seem to 
be steeper for shares with a more significant ETF ownership.  
Based on these results, it seems that instead of shareholders requiring a premium on 
their investment, shares with higher ETF ownership are considered to be less risky and 
therefore the requirement for a premium diminish. However, this correlation does not 
count for any controlling variables such as company size. As already stated earlier, com-
pany market capitalization is highly correlated with ETF ownership and therefore com-
panies with a high ETF ownership may be larger and more established and would require 
a smaller premium due to the safety that the company size provides.  
To further study the impact of ETF ownership on the excess returns of the underlying 
shares, in Table 12, Panel B I run a regression for the high-minus-low ETF ownership 
portfolio. The dependent variable is constructed by building two portfolios based on ETF 
ownership percentage and by subtracting the returns of the low ETF ownership portfolio 
from the high ETF ownership portfolio. In Panel B, alpha seems to be highly negatively 
and significantly correlated with the high-minus-low portfolio. Introducing the Fama and 
French (1997) three factor model (MKTRF, SMB and HML) does not change the impact 
of alpha. Adding the Fama and French (2015) five factor model’s two factors (RMW, 
CMA), no significant changes appear.  
 Table 12 
ETF ownership and returns 
Panel A presents five quantile portfolios constructed based on the level of ETF ownership in the company. Monthly 
excess return has been calculated for each portfolio equally weighted. Panel B presents the return of a high-minus-
low ETF ownership portfolio on alpha. The factors are the five factors (MRKRF, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA) from 
Fama & French (2015, Europe) and momentum. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors 
are presented in Appendix A, Table 18. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify 
statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Panel A: Excess Returns for the Quantile Portfolios 
 Quantiles Based on ETF ownership 
  Low (2) (3) (4) High 
Monthly excess returns -0.001 -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.010** -0.013** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
      
Number of months 120 120 120 120 120 
 
Panel B: High-Minus-Low Portfolio, Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: Return(High-Minus-Low ETF Ownership) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Alpha -0.242*** -0.225*** -0.200*** -0.214*** -0.213*** -0.197*** -0.208*** 
 (0.033) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.052) 
MKTRF  -0.019 -0.056 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 0.006 
  (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
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Panel B – continued 
SMB   -0.322*** -0.311*** -0.317*** -0.303*** -0.287** 
   (0.084) (0.083) (0.085) (0.086) (0.089) 
HML    -0.152 -0.182 -0.233. -0.251* 
    (0.068) (0.113) (0.120) (0.124) 
RMW     -0.054 0.044 -0.072 
     (0.161) (0.161) (0.167) 
CMA      0.177 0.185 
      (0.145) (0.146) 
Momentum       0.000 
       (0.001) 
        
Number of months 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.3078 0.3090 0.3861 0.4118 0.4124 0.4200 0.4222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3020 0.2972 0.3702 0.3913 0.3866 0.3892 0.3861 
The results are consistent with the outcome of the correlation between ETF ownership 
and volatility. As ETF ownership decreases the volatility in the underlying shares, the 
amount of risk also decreases resulting in lower excess return. As the share is less risky, 
shareholders decrease their demand for a premium based on this risk. Alphas therefore 
decrease significantly as ETF ownership increases making the market more stable. 
However, the results are again in contrast with previous empirical studies made on the 
subject. As Ben-David et al. (2018) stated, ETFs do significantly modify the underlying 
stock’s returns distribution, but in this case the direction of this modification is the oppo-
site. In the Nordics, ETFs do not seem to impound a new source of non-diversifiable risk 
into the underlying shares but on the contrary, they seem to reduce non-diversifiable risk. 
4.5 Robustness 
In this section the robustness of this study is going to be discussed. A coefficient test has 
been conducted in order to receive heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent co-
efficients for each core regression in this study. The heteroscedasticity and autocorrela-
tion consistent coefficients did not alter the results in any meaningful way. The tables for 
the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients are presented in Appen-
dix D. 
For the main regression and research question, on how ETF ownership in shares affect 
the volatility of the underlying shares, I have performed regressions with several subsam-
ples and reached the same results; ETF ownership reduces volatility in the underlying 
shares. Some variation occurred in the magnitude of the effect when dividing the sample 
into subsamples, but the overall result did not change. The effect of ETFs on volatility 
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seemed to be slightly stronger during 2009-2013 than 2014-2018 but difference was more 
or less trivial. However, when dividing the data into annual subsamples (Appendix B, 
Table 19), only 5 out of 10 years were statistically significant regarding the relation be-
tween ETF ownership and daily stock volatility. Those years that the correlation was sig-
nificant, the effect was negative, i.e. ETF ownership decreases volatility. 
The data was also divided into subsamples based on their industry classification which 
was retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon. A table of the industry classifications are 
shown in Appendix B, Table 21. Several industry subsets were relatively small in terms 
of number of observations and therefore adjusted R-squared shifted to negative. However, 
in all of the cases that adjusted R-squared was positive, ETF ownership was negatively 
and significantly correlated with volatility. The largest impact seemed to be in the real 
estate, rental and leasing sector. In addition,  the manufacturing, and finance and insur-
ance sector was found to be affected by ETF ownership. The results of the regressions on 
the industry subsamples are presented in Appendix B, Table 20. 
ETF ownership level subsamples showed a non-linear relationship between ETF own-
ership and stock volatility, but the direction of the effect remained constant. Because the 
non-linear relationship, another method should have been used to gain solid results of the 
correlation, but since the goal was to reach comparable results with Ben-David et al. 
(2018), regression analysis was used.  
To test the possible non-linearity of the regression I construct two regressions for ETF 
ownership and daily stock volatility: a linear regression and a non-linear regression. The 
plotted regressions are presented in Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10 Linear regression for ETF ownership and daily stock volatility 
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Figure 11 Non-linear regression for ETF ownership and daily stock volatility 
Calculating the regressions, suggest that the non-linear regression is a better fitting 
model with an R-squared of 0.0318, whereas the linear regression has an R-squared of 
0.0224. The linear regression was calculated as  
 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 × 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡, (22) 
and the non-linear regression as 
 
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1  ×  𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽2 × 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡
2
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
(23) 
To control for other types of institutional ownership, I added index fund ownership 
and hedge fund ownership as controlling factors. Other institutional ownership did not 
alter the results. The heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients shown 
in Table 13 are consistent with the results given earlier. ETF ownership remains nega-
tively correlated at a 1% significance level. 
When testing the effect of ETF ownership on share liquidity, I chose three different 
measures of liquidity and all of the regressions reached more or less the same results. ETF 
ownership level ceased to be significantly correlated with bid-ask-spread when perform-
ing the coefficient test, and this was taken into account in the interpretation of the results. 
In addition, it was noted that ETF ownership would not have been statistically signifi-
cantly correlated with Amihud ratio if it wasn’t for removal of outliers. 
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5 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
In this thesis I conduct an extensive study on the effect of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) 
on the volatility of the underlying shares. In addition, I provide supporting evidence for 
the results of the main research question by studying the effect of ETFs on share liquidity, 
return comovement and excess return. I extend the research of Ben-David et al. (2018) 
by studying the impact of ETFs on the Nordic market, a smaller and more illiquid market 
than the US. To the best of my knowledge, no previous studies have been made on the 
impact of ETFs in the Nordic market and the findings of this thesis are valuable to the 
academic and business world since it brings out completely new angles to the topic. 
Exchange-traded funds have experienced a significant growth in terms of size and pop-
ularity due to the cost efficiencies and diversification benefits that they provide. In addi-
tion, ETFs provide access to more illiquid markets through their funds. Due to the abrupt 
rise of ETFs, academics and the regulators have paid more attention to the subject and 
found that ETFs may have a disruptive effect on the stock market. Ben-David et al. (2018) 
found that in the US ETFs cause excessive increase in volatility in the underlying shares 
due to their unique arbitrage process. In addition, ETFs appeared to introduce a new layer 
of undiversifiable risk into the underlying stock. Therefore, ETFs may have a dangerous 
destabilizing effect on the stock market. However, the existing literature nearly only fo-
cuses on the US market which is a highly accessible market.  
To extend previous research made on the effect of ETFs, I conducted a study focusing 
on the Nordic market. Using the data from the OMX Nordic 120 index shares from Jan-
uary 2009 to December 2018, I run a regression to measure the impact of ETF ownership 
on daily stock volatility and I find that ETF ownership is significantly and negatively 
correlated with daily stock volatility. Instead of adding volatility, as first predicted, ETFs 
decrease volatility in the underlying stock. The effect was found to be even stronger 
among shares with higher market capitalization. In addition, there seemed to be a non-
linear relationship between ETF ownership and volatility as the volatility decreasing ef-
fect dampened after a certain point of ETF ownership. 
Since the results found did not follow the one’s presented by Ben-David et al. (2018), 
a new hypothesis needed to be constructed. The most obvious differences between the 
US and the Nordic market is size and liquidity. Perhaps, instead of taking away liquidity 
from the underlying stock, ETFs act as liquidity providers for the stock market. Following 
previous studies on ownership structure, ETFs may bring new informed competition to 
the market making it more efficient. This effect is commonly known as the trading hy-
pothesis.  
To test the effect of ETFs on stock market efficiency and to extend our understanding 
on the reasons behind ETFs effect on volatility, I test the relationship between ETFs and 
three different measures on share liquidity: trading volume, bid-ask-spread and Amihud 
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ratio (Amihud, 2002). The findings were consistent with the trading hypothesis. As Ben-
David et al. (2018) mentioned in their study, ETFs do add a new layer of trading in the 
underlying stock, also in the Nordic market. This was confirmed by running a  regression 
measuring the relation between ETFs and stock trading volume. However, ETF fund 
flows were found to be negatively correlated with bid-ask-spread and ETF ownership was 
also found to be negatively correlated with Amihud ratio (Amihud, 2002), a commonly 
used illiquidity measure. Overall, ETFs seemed to add liquidity into the shares even 
though the arbitrage activity is commonly thought to absorb liquidity away from the 
shares. In the Nordic market, ETFs add trading which then extends to added stock liquid-
ity making the market more efficient. 
Another common assumption on ETFs, and moreover index investing in general, is 
that they add commonality in the underlying stock more than their fundamentals would 
suggest. This was found to be untrue in the Nordic market. I examined the relation be-
tween ETF ownership and return comovement of the underlying stock and concluded that 
ETFs decrease return comovement. I further studied if this effect would be excessive by 
regressing ETF ownership against lagged return comovement over several time horizons 
but found the effect to be consistent and does not experience reversal.  
Finally, we study the effect of ETFs on stock returns. Ben-David et al. (2018) found 
that ETFs add a new source of risk to the underlying stock that cannot necessarily be 
diversified away since ETFs invest nearly across all stocks. The question was if investors 
require a premium for the added risk, even if the risk was only temporary. The answer 
was yes, investors do require a premium. Since ETFs reduce information risk in the Nor-
dic market it would be logical to predict that investors would not require a premium but 
on the contrary. I replicated the test made by Ben-David et al. (2018) using Nordic data 
and found that ETF ownership reduce excess return. Again, the results are consistent with 
the trading hypothesis.  
To sum, the results found in the Nordic market are significantly different than the ones 
found in the US market. In the Nordics, ETFs seem to act as liquidity providers adding 
trading and efficiency, and simultaneously reducing volatility, adding liquidity and de-
creasing overall risk by improving diversification chances. The one thing found to be 
similar in the US and Nordic market is that ETFs add trading. However, the effect that 
this added trading have on the stock market is different. As the Nordic market is less 
liquid, the fact that ETFs bring more informed investors to the market, result in more 
competition and better information efficiency in the market.  
Since it was discovered that ETFs may have a non-linear relationship with ETFs, it 
cannot be confirmed that these benefits that ETFs seem to provide to the stock market in 
the Nordics would remain unchanged. The non-linearity of the correlation would suggest 
that at this moment, while the Nordic market is still relatively illiquid and young, ETFs 
do provide benefits to the stocks. However, as the market grows the impact might reverse. 
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The effect that ETFs have on the stock market in the US, a more established market may 
be the future for the Nordics too. 
The results imply that the Nordic and the US market are at different stages regarding 
stock market development. As the Nordic market grows and further develops or integrates 
more with the global market, it is important to pay attention to the change that may happen 
in the effect of ETFs. Based in the information provided in this study, the Nordic market 
should welcome ETFs and furthermore informed investors. On the other hand, regulators 
should be aware of the effect that ETFs may have in the future as the market grows. 
Agarwal (2007) found that institutional ownership adds liquidity in the underlying shares 
up to a certain point. After the ownership exceeded 40% the effect turned around. The 
results of this study imply a similar effect as ETF ownership was found to demonstrate a 
non-linear correlation to volatility. Therefore, the same effect could happen in the Nordic 
regarding ETFs. As long as the Nordic market remains relatively illiquid, it benefits from 
more informed investors but at some point, added ETFs and trading volume may result 
in added noise and volatility. 
5.1 Suggestions for further research 
This study contributed to the existing literature in several ways. First, the impact of ETFs 
has been rarely studied in any other markets than in the US market. Further, no studies 
on the subject had been made using data from the Nordic market. Second, the results 
found in the Nordic market differ significantly from the ones found in the US. Not only 
were the results different but on many parts, they were the complete opposite. That is why 
the topic and the reasons behind the opposite results should be further researched.  
The conclusion reached in this study was that due to the lack of liquidity and size in 
the Nordic market, introducing new informed investors adds a new layer of competition 
leading to a more efficient market. However, there were many fields that remained unre-
searched.  
Fist, the inspection of fund-level differences between the Nordic and the US market 
were excluded from this study. To fully understand the differenced of the ETF market we 
need to examine the activities of ETFs on fund level. Even though ETFs investing in the 
Nordic market are international and rarely from the Nordic countries, there might be dif-
ferences between funds investing in the US stock market and in the Nordic stock market.  
Second, in this study I used monthly data. To further investigate the impact of fund 
flows, daily fund flows should be examined to reach more specific results. In addition, 
volatility was calculated as daily stock volatility. The impact of ETFs should also be cal-
culated on intraday volatility. Even if ETFs would decrease daily volatility, it might have 
a different effect on intraday volatility. 
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Third, it would be interesting to investigate the same impact that ETFs have on other 
European markets, such as Germany or France, that are larger than the Nordic market in 
terms of size, and more liquid, but still smaller and less liquid than the US. The interesting 
aspect would be, in which point does the effect of ETFs change from liquidity provision 
(in the Nordics) to liquidity trading (in the US). By studying countries in different stages 
of stock market development and size, the future impact of ETFs in the Nordics could be 
predicted based on findings made in other markets. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Heteroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent coefficients 
Table 13  
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients  
for ETF ownership and daily stock volatility 
This table presents the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for Table 4 presenting the rela-
tionship between ETF ownership and daily stock volatility. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, 
**, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ETF ownership -0.071**   
 (0.022)   
ETF turnover   -0.0002*  
 
 
(0.000)  
ETF ownership flow   -0.001. 
 
 
 (0.001) 
Index fund ownership 0.002 -0.007 -0.012 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Hedge fund ownership -0.026 -0.024 -0.034. 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
Log(Market Cap EUR) -0.002 -0.002 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Volume 0.271*** 0.247** 0.253** 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.088) 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.038 0.029 0.088* 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.034) 
1/Price 0.006 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
12 month return -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Amihud ratio -0.000 -0.000 0.000. 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book to Market 0.002 0.002 0.002. 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gross profitability -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Skewness 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 14 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for trading volume 
This table presents the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for Table 7 presenting the rela-
tionship between ETF ownership and trading volume. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * 
and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: Trading volume 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ETF ownership 0.093*   
 (0.042)   
ETF turnover  0.000  
  (0.000)  
ETF flow   0.000 
   (0.001) 
Index fund ownership 0.007 0.020 0.021. 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Hedge fund ownership -0.014 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
Log(Market Cap) -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gross profitability -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
12-month return 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book-to-Market ratio -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Amihud ratio -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bid-ask-spread -0.023 -0.015 0.008 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.029) 
    
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 15 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for bid-ask-spread 
This table presents the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for Table 88 presenting the re-
lationship between ETF ownership and bid-ask-spread. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * 
and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: Bid-ask-spread 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ETF ownership 0.014.   
 (0.008)   
ETF turnover  -0.000**  
  (0.000)  
ETF flow   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Index fund ownership 0.027 0.030. 0.029. 
 (0.17) (0.018) (0.018) 
Hedge fund ownership 0.055 0.054 0.060 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Log(Market cap) -0.003*** -0.003** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1/Price 0.005* 0.005* 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
12-month return 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book-to-market ratio 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Free float % 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 16 
 Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for Amihud ratio 
This table presents the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for Table 9 presenting the rela-
tionship between ETF ownership and Amihud ratio (2002). Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, 
**, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: Amihud ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) 
ETF ownership -0.310***   
 (0.120)   
ETF turnover  -0.002.  
  (0.001)  
ETF flow   0.001 
   (0.004) 
Index fund ownership 0.042 0.009 0.023 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) 
Hedge fund ownership -0.027 -0.022 -0.004 
 (0.156) (0.149) (0.152) 
Log(Market Cap) -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.089*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Gross profitability 0.011 0.012 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
12-month return 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Book-to-Market ratio 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trading volume -2.736*** -2.860*** -3.262*** 
 (0.473) (0.465) (0.577) 
Bid-ask-spread 0.611 0.571 0.482 
 (0.526) (0.520) (0.499) 
    
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 17 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for return comovement 
This table presents the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for Table 10 presenting the rela-
tionship between ETF ownership and beta. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify 
statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: Beta 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ETF ownership -0.105***   
 (0.021)   
ETF turnover   -0.010  
  (0.011)  
ETF ownership flow   -0.009 
   (0.008) 
Index fund ownership 0.050 0.016 0.011 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) 
Hedge fund ownership 0.002 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Log(Market Cap EUR) -0.448** -0.430** -0.286* 
 (0.141) (0.148) (0.136) 
Volume 0.609 2.310 3.723 
 (3.927) (3.924) (4.091) 
Book to Market -0.066 -0.070 -0.058 
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) 
    
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 18 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for excess returns 
This table presents the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficients for Table 12, Panel B presenting 
the relationship between ETF ownership and the return of a high ETF ownership minus low ETF ownership portfolio. 
Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable:  Return(High-Minus-Low ETF Ownership) 
Alpha -0.208** 
 (0.067) 
MKTRF 0.005 
 (0.052) 
SMB -0.289** 
 (0.088) 
HML -0.251* 
 (0.126) 
RMW -0.072 
 (0.162) 
CMA 0.185 
 (0.135) 
Momentum 0.000 
  (0.001) 
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Appendix B: Robustness subsets 
Table 19 
Subsamples - Annual samples 
This table presents the stock/month panel regression measuring the effect of ETF ownership of a stock included in the OMX Nordic 120 on its volatility divided into subsamples based on annual 
samples. Share volatility is calculated as the average daily volatility of each share in the previous month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson 
Reuters -database, on the last day of each month. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the change in ETF ownership in the share each month. 
Index fund ownership is the percentage of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in index fund ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of 
the stock held by hedge funds on the last day of each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. Volume is the average daily trading volume of each 
share during the previous month. Gross profitability is calculated as Novy-Marx (2013). 1/Price is the inverse share price during the last day of the month. 12-month return is the return of the stock 
during the previous year. Book to Market is the book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. Amihud ratio is calculated as Amihud (2002). Bid-ask-spread is calculated as 
the average bid-ask-spread of a stock during the previous month. Skewness is the average daily skewness of each share during the previous month. Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. 
***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the explanatory power of fixed effects. 
Dependent variable Volatility 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ETF ownership 0.060 -0.004 -0.126* -0.133** 0.014 0.011 -0.062** -0.179* 0.041 0.157*** 
 (0.112) (0.054) (0.049) (0.049) (0.034) (0.036) (0.023) (0.070) (0.039) (0.036) 
Index fund ownership 0.007 -0.012 0.021 -0.004 0.009 0.026 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.031 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.017) (0.029) 
Hedge fund ownership 0.056 -0.337*** 0.014 -0.011 0.020 -0.036 0.038 -0.036 -0.071 0.076 
 (0.041) (0.049) (0.047) (0.195) (0.045) (0.111) (0.094) (0.072) (0.058) (0.057) 
Log(Market Cap EUR) -0.008* -0.003 -0.021*** 0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 0.004 0.009*** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Volume 0.346*** 0.269*** 0.559*** 0.570*** 0.238*** 0.518*** 0.609*** 1.371*** 2.998*** 2.243*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.065) (0.078) (0.048) (0.065) (0.083) (0.121) (0.143) (0.144) 
Bid-Ask Spread -0.092 0.060 0.056 -0.053 0.088 0.310. 1.192*** 0.549 1.510*** 1.365. 
 (0.063) (0.042) (0.059) (0.072) (0.068) (0.184) (0.357) (0.738) (0.702) (0.758) 
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Annual samples – constinued 
1/Price 0.008** 0.040* 0.021. 0.067*** -0.030. -0.079* 0.011 0.074* 0.084* 0.035 
 
(0.003) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.032) (0.050) (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) 
12 month return -0.003*** 0.000* -0.001 -0.002. 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Amihud ratio 0.000 0.001* 0.001* -0.000 0.001 0.001. 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.010*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Book to Market -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006* 0.005** 0.001 0.003* 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Gross profitability -0.000 0.001 0.014 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.013 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
Skewness 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,080 1,090 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,127 1,142 1,159 1,171 1,196 
R-squared 0.1321 0.1328 0.1755 0.0849 0.0661 0.0915 0.0928 0.1651 0.3239 0.2274 
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Table 20 
Subsamples - Industry samples 
This table presents the stock/month panel regression measuring the effect of ETF ownership of a stock included in the OMX Nordic 120 on its volatility divided into subsamples based on industry 
classifications retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Share volatility is calculated as the average daily volatility of each share in the previous month. ETF ownership is the percentage of the stock 
held by ETF's, using data from Eikon Thomson Reuters -database, on the last day of each month. ETF turnover is the weighted turnover of ETF's holding of the share. ETF ownership flow is the 
change in ETF ownership in the share each month. Index fund ownership is the percentage of stock held by index funds on the last day of each month. ETF ownership is included in index fund 
ownership. Hedge fund ownership is the percentage of the stock held by hedge funds on the last day of each month. Log(Market Cap) is the firm's market capitalization on the last day of each month. 
Volume is the average daily trading volume of each share during the previous month. Gross profitability is calculated as Novy-Marx (2013). 1/Price is the inverse share price during the last day of 
the month. 12-month return is the return of the stock during the previous year. Book to Market is the book to market ratio of each company on the last day of each month. Amihud ratio is calculated 
as Amihud (2002). Bid-ask-spread is calculated as the average bid-ask-spread of a stock during the previous month. Skewness is the average daily skewness of each share during the previous month. 
Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, * and . signify statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. R-squared excludes the explanatory power of fixed effects. 
Dependent variable Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ETF ownership -0.081*** -0.042 -0.162 -0.151*** -0.048** 0.044 -0.027 0.049 0.024 -0.266 
 (0.013) (0.051) (0.127) (0.028) (0.015) (0.033) (0.030) (0.306) (0.052) (0.306) 
Index fund ownership 0.022*** 0.002 0.039 -0.000 0.023. -0.106. -0.021 -0.123 -0.154 -0.074 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.062) (0.014) (0.012) (0.060) (0.015) (0.308) (0.207) (0.059) 
Hedge fund ownership -0.041*** 0.092. -0.408* 0.443** -0.078** 0.017 0.131 -0.128 -0.068 0.906. 
 (0.013) (0.055) (0.194) (0.148) (0.012) (0.019) (0.085) (0.698) (0.081) (0.523) 
Log(Market Cap EUR) 0.000 0.005 0.002 -0.008* -0.012*** -0.004 0.005** -0.059 -0.004 -0.018 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.053) (0.007) (0.026) 
Volume 0.373*** 0.806*** 0.732*** 0.495*** 0.064* 0.049 0.225** 0.927 1.181*** 2.420*** 
 (0.021) (0.128) (0.141) (0.087) (0.027) (0.092) (0.079) (0.809) (0.211) (0.459) 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.045* -0.312 0.402 0.345** 0.268* 0.542. 0.135. -6.099 -1.711 2.005 
 (0.021) (0.330) (0.369) (0.116) (0.131) (0.323) (0.071) (7.844) (1.034) (1.675) 
1/Price 0.006*** -0.222 0.103 -0.144*** 0.055*** -0.374 -0.134*** -0.797. -0.198*** -0.241* 
 
(0.002) (0.169) (0.123) (0.039) (0.013) (0.293) (0.039) (0.457) (0.211) (0.099) 
12 month return -0.001** -0.003* 0.002 -0.001 0.001. 0.001 -0.003** 0.008 -0.001 0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) 
Amihud ratio 0.000 0.061*** 0.007 0.000* 0.001*** 0.091* 0.027*** 0.025* 0.017. 0.010* 
 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005) 
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Industry samples - continued 
Book to Market 0.001*** 0.006* 0.010. -0.001** 0.006*** 0.006 0.007** 0.065* 0.044* 0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.030) (0.021) (0.009) 
Gross profitability -0.008*** -0.016* -0.020* -0.022 0.139*** 0.004* 0.001 -0.138 -0.026 -0.023 
 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.041) (0.023) (0.002) (0.003) (0.123) (0.030) (0.020) 
Skewness 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.001. -0.000* 0.001* -0.001*** 0.000 0.002. 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
           
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 6,328 538 480 360 1,560 360 720 151 240 180 
R-squared 0.0965 0.2010 0.2532 0.4105 0.2665 0.2775 0.0999 0.5559 0.3596 0.5903 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0688 -0.0673 -0.0368 0.0636 0.1924 -0.1477 -0.1101 -2.7007 -0.4305 -0.5605 
 
Table 21 Industry classifications 
No. Industry 
(1) Manufacturing 
(2) Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 
(3) Retail Trade 
(4) Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 
(5) Finance and Insurance 
(6) Transportation and Warehousing 
(7) Information 
(8) Utilities 
(9) Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
(10) Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 
81 
 
Appendix C: Commands used in R 
Correlations in Table 3 
> cor(OG, use=”complete.obs”) 
ETF ownership and share volatility in Table 4 
Fixed effects using plm 
> x2<-plm(volatility ~ etf + index + hedge + mc + volume + bidask + pr
ice + ret + amihud + bm + prof, data=OG, index=c("comp", "date"), ,mod
el="within", effect="twoways") 
Coefficient test 
> coeftest(x2, vcov. = vcovHC, type="HC1") 
ETF ownership and share liquidity in Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 
Fixed effects using plm 
> fixed<- plm(bidask ~ etf + index + hedge + mc + price + ret + bm + R
_template$Freef, data=OG, index = c("comp", "date"), model="within") 
Coefficient test 
> coeftest(fixed, vcov. = vcovHC, type="HC1") 
ETF ownership and share comovement in Table 10 
Fixed effects using plm 
> como<- plm(beta ~ etf + index + hedge + mc + volume + bm, data=OG, i
ndex = c("comp", "date"), model="within") 
Coefficient test 
> coeftest(como, vcov. = vcovHC, type="HC1") 
ETF ownership and excess returns in Table 12 
Panel A 
> reg20<-rq(ETF ~ exret, data=quantile, tau=c(0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 
0.95)) 
Panel B 
> highlow<-lm(ret ~ alpha + mktrf + smb + hml + rmw + cma + mom, 
data=high) 
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ETF ownership and Amihud ratio – removal of outliers in Table 9 
 
Illustration of Amihud ratios with outliers. 
> boxplot(OG$amihud) 
 
Removal of outliers 
> boxplot(OG$amihud)$out 
> outliers<-(boxplot(OG$amihud)$out) 
> OG[which(OG$amihud %in% outliers),] 
> boxplot(out$amihud) 
Illustration of Amihud ratios after removal of outliers. 
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Appendix D: Companies included in the sample 
No. Ticker Company name Country of headquarters Comment 
1 AAK.ST AAK AB (publ) Sweden  
2 ABB Abb Ltd Switzerland  
3 ALFA.ST Alfa Laval AB Sweden  
4 ALV Autoliv Inc Sweden  
5 AMBUb.CO Ambu A/S Denmark  
6 AMEAS.HE Amer Sports Oyj Finland  
7 ASSAb.ST Assa Abloy AB Sweden  
8 ATCOa.ST Atlas Copco AB Sweden  
9 ATCOb.ST Atlas Copco AB Sweden  
10 AXFO.ST Axfood AB Sweden  
11 AZN.L AstraZeneca PLC United Kingdom  
12 BALDb.ST Fastighets AB Balder Sweden  
13 BILL.ST BillerudKorsnas AB (publ) Sweden  
14 BOL.ST Boliden AB Sweden  
15 CARLb.CO Carlsberg A/S Denmark  
16 CAST.ST Castellum AB Sweden  
17 CGCBV.HE Cargotec Oyj Finland  
18 CHRH.CO Chr Hansen Holding A/S Denmark Listed during sample period 
19 COLOb.CO Coloplast A/S Denmark  
20 DANSKE.CO Danske Bank A/S Denmark  
21 DOMETIC.ST Dometic Group AB (publ) Sweden Listed during sample period 
22 DSV.CO DSV A/S Denmark  
23 EKTAb.ST Elekta AB (publ) Sweden  
24 ELISA.HE Elisa Oyj Finland  
25 ELUXb.ST Electrolux AB Sweden  
26 EPIRa.ST Epiroc AB Sweden Listed during sample period 
27 EPIRb.ST Epiroc AB Sweden Listed during sample period 
28 ERIBR.HE Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson Sweden Excluded from the sample 
29 ESSITYb.ST Essity AB (publ) Sweden Listed during sample period 
30 FABG.ST Fabege AB Sweden  
31 FLS.CO Flsmidth & Co A/S Denmark  
32 FORTUM.HE Fortum Oyj Finland  
33 GEN.CO Genmab A/S Denmark  
34 GETIb.ST Getinge AB Sweden  
35 GN.CO GN Store Nord A/S Denmark  
36 HEXAb.ST Hexagon AB Sweden  
37 HMb.ST H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB Sweden  
38 HPOLb.ST Hexpol AB Sweden  
39 HUH1V.HE Huhtamaki Oyj Finland  
40 HUSQb.ST Husqvarna AB Sweden  
41 ICAA.ST ICA Gruppen AB Sweden  
42 INDUc.ST Industrivarden AB Sweden  
43 INTRUM.ST Intrum AB Sweden  
44 INVEa.ST Investor AB Sweden  
45 INVEb.ST Investor AB Sweden  
46 ISS.CO Iss A/S Denmark Listed during sample period 
47 JYSK.CO Jyske Bank A/S Denmark  
48 KCRA.HE Konecranes Abp Finland  
49 KESKOB.HE Kesko Oyj Finland  
50 KINDsdb.ST Kindred Group PLC Malta  
51 KINVb.ST Kinnevik AB Sweden  
52 KNEBV.HE Kone Oyj Finland  
53 LOOMb.ST Loomis AB Sweden  
54 LUN.CO H Lundbeck A/S Denmark  
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55 LUPE.ST Lundin Petroleum AB Sweden  
56 MAERSKa.CO AP Moeller - Maersk A/S Denmark  
57 MAERSKb.CO AP Moeller - Maersk A/S Denmark  
58 METSB.HE Metsa Board Oyj Finland  
59 METSO.HE Metso Oyj Finland  
60 MTGb.ST Modern Times Group MTG AB Sweden  
61 NDAFI.HE Nordea Bank Abp Finland  
62 NESTE.HE Neste Oyj Finland  
63 NIBEb.ST Nibe Industrier AB Sweden  
64 NOKIA.HE Nokia Oyj Finland  
65 NOVOb.CO Novo Nordisk A/S Denmark  
66 NRE1V.HE Nokian Tyres plc Finland  
67 NZYMb.CO Novozymes A/S Denmark  
68 ORNBV.HE Orion Oyj Finland  
69 ORSTED.CO Orsted A/S Denmark Listed during sample period 
70 PNDORA.CO Pandora A/S Denmark Listed during sample period 
71 RBREW.CO Royal Unibrew A/S Denmark  
72 ROCKb.CO Rockwool International A/S Denmark  
73 SAABb.ST Saab AB Sweden  
74 SAMPO.HE Sampo Oyj Finland  
75 SAND.ST Sandvik AB Sweden  
76 SCAb.ST Svenska Cellulosa SCA AB Sweden  
77 SEBa.ST Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden  
78 SECUb.ST Securitas AB Sweden  
79 SHBa.ST Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden  
80 SIM.CO Simcorp A/S Denmark  
81 SKAb.ST Skanska AB Sweden  
82 SKFb.ST AB SKF Sweden  
83 SOBIV.ST Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB (publ) Sweden  
84 SSABb.ST SSAB AB Sweden  
85 STERV.HE Stora Enso Oyj Finland  
86 SWEDa.ST Swedbank AB Sweden  
87 SWMA.ST Swedish Match AB Sweden  
88 SYDB.CO Sydbank A/S Denmark  
89 TEL2b.ST Tele2 AB Sweden  
90 TELIA.ST Telia Company AB Sweden  
91 THULE.ST Thule Group AB Sweden Listed during sample period 
92 TIGOsdb.ST Millicom International Cellular SA Luxembourg  
93 TOP.CO Topdanmark A/S Denmark  
94 TRELb.ST Trelleborg AB Sweden  
95 TRYG.CO Tryg A/S Denmark  
96 UPM.HE UPM-Kymmene Oyj Finland  
97 VALMT.HE Valmet Oyj Finland Listed during sample period 
98 VNE Veoneer Inc Sweden Listed during sample period 
99 VOLVb.ST Volvo AB Sweden  
100 VWS.CO Vestas Wind Systems A/S Denmark  
101 WDH.CO Demant A/S Denmark  
102 WRT1V.HE Wartsila Oyj Abp Finland  
 
 
 
